ANNUAL STATE OF CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS REPORT
SECOND REPORT
March 2016
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<td>BCOC</td>
<td>Border Control Operational Coordination Committee</td>
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<td>BMA</td>
<td>Border Management Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-BRTA</td>
<td>Cross Border Road Transport Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>CSIR</td>
<td>Council for Scientific and Industrial Research</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<td>DHA</td>
<td>Department of Home Affairs</td>
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<td>DOT</td>
<td>Department of Transport</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
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<td>North South Corridor</td>
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<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
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<td>Road Traffic Infringement Agency</td>
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<td>Road Traffic Management Corporation</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
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<td>SARS</td>
<td>South African Revenue Service</td>
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<td>TCC</td>
<td>Traffic Control Centre</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>United Nations Decade of Action</td>
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<td>World Customs Organisation</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Cross-Border Operations Report serves to inform the Minister of Transport and other relevant public and private sector stakeholders of challenges and developments taking place within the cross-border road transport industry. This report also proposes a number of recommendations that intend to address cross-border road transport constraints.

The C-BRTA was established as a regulatory authority under the Cross-border Road Transport Act No 4 of 1998, as amended, to spearhead economic development within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) through facilitating the unimpeded flow of cross-border road transport movements. The Agency performs 4 functions towards the delivery of its mandate. These functions revolve around, advising all role-players of cross-border road transport developments, regulating market access through the issuing of cross-border road transport permits, establishing co-operative and consultative structures between public and private sector institutions, and undertaking road transport law enforcement.

The semester 2 report focused on two main themes:

   a) Assessing the state of commercial border posts; and

   b) Assessing road safety and operator compliance in South Africa.

South Africa has many border posts of varying size. In addition to the 53 commercial border posts, evidence reveals the existence of other “unofficial” entry points into the country. While border posts should facilitate the free movement of traffic and only act as stop points for good reason, border posts in the SADC region act as trade security, instead of trade facilitation points.

Currently SADC land borders are characterised by various infrastructure and operational constraints. Impediments such as inadequate approach roads to border posts, inadequate parking for vehicles within the border precinct, no separation and freight and passenger traffic, limited cooperation and coordination amongst border post officials and complex documentation and inspection systems are examples of hard and soft infrastructure constraints that result in excessive delays for cross-border road transport operators.

In addition to the above-mentioned infrastructure constraints, operational impediments such as the incorrect placing of ranking facilities, power outages at border posts, limited operating hours of border posts, absence of cargo scanners, crime and shortage of trained and competent staff impede the seamless movement of traffic across national borders, thereby increasing the cost of doing business in the SADC region.
As far as road safety is concerned, South Africa is singled out as one of the worst performing countries in the world as far as road safety is concerned. The majority of road accidents in South Africa are caused by poor driver behaviour, which manifest in actions such as speeding, driving under the influence of alcohol and jay walking.

Further to the above, the findings of a study conducted by the World Health Organisation (WHO) in 2013 places South Africa at the bottom of the list in terms of the level / quality of traffic law enforcement. One finding of this study is that a strong correlation exists between the quality of law enforcement and the fatality rate on roads.

The poor state of affairs at border posts, coupled with South Africa’s poor road safety and law enforcement record calls for urgent intervention. As far as commercial border posts are concerned, plans to establish a single Border Management Agency (BMA) by April 2017 is still on track, depending on the enactment of the BMA Bill in 2016. The belief exists that a single integrated authority for border law enforcement will result in more cost-effective services, enhanced security and better management of the border environment, which will culminate in a reduction in delays for cross-border road transport operators.

Further to the above, a number of One Stop Border Post (OSBP) projects have been prioritised for implementation in the SADC region in a phased manner between 2012 and 2027. The implementation of border post projects however, requires major commitment of sustainable financial and human resources. This poses a challenge since most member states do not possess the technical or financial means to implement projects at national level.

In addition, a lack of political will amongst member states to implement projects and the absence of national and regional implementation institutions and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms stand in the way of implementing strategic cross-border infrastructure projects within specified time frames.

Although various road safety campaigns and initiatives have been launched in South Africa to improve road safety, these interventions have not yet yielded the desired results. A lack of real-time data on road traffic offences is partly to blame for this tendency. In the absence of reliable data, it becomes difficult to accurately determine the level of operator / driver compliance on South African roads.

In response to the above constraint, the Road Traffic Management Corporation (RTMC) has recently embarked on a process of establishing a national database into which all traffic infringements will be documented by metro’s, provincial and local governments and the national traffic police. The output of this system will compliment outsourced traffic offence surveys. Furthermore it will provide an incessant (continuous) traffic offence survey on normal policing activities.
In light of the above background, the semester 2 report proposes a number of recommendations (reforms) and action plans that intend to improve the seamless flow of traffic along regional road transport corridors; inter alia, through improving border post efficiency, enhancing the quality of roadside law enforcement checks and bettering driver behaviour.

**Infrastructure Constraints at Commercial Border Posts**

- In order to address hard and soft infrastructure constraints at border posts, the timeous implementation of border post projects, prioritised in the SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan (RIDMP), is of paramount importance. All border post projects aim to transform prioritised commercial border posts into OSBPs in the long run. Since the success of OSBP projects depend on cooperation amongst border agencies on both sides of the border and their respective governments, it is apparent that political will and commitment should be obtained from all role-players to accrue the benefits of OSPBs.

**Operational Constraints at Commercial Border Posts**

- The establishment of public ranking facilities in close proximity to border posts should be prohibited. Law enforcement visibility at border posts should increase and heavy fines should be imposed on operators who contravene the stipulations of applicable legislation;
- The operating hours of commercial border posts should be extended to allow the 24 hour functioning of border posts, all year round. This requires member states to devise new resource plans to enable to skills transfer (in cases where skills shortages exist) and to set additional funds aside to enable the deployment of additional resources, according to OSBP requirements;
- Long-term solutions (e.g. building of new power stations) should be sought to the region’s power supply constraints. In the interim, all commercial border posts should be equipped with generators, capable of producing sufficient power supply to enable the normal functioning of inland border posts;
- The use of modern technologies facilitates the speedy clearance of traffic. Many border posts do not employ cargo scanning and automatic number plate recognition technologies (ANPR). In order to address this constraint, adequate funds should be set aside at member state level to cover the costs associated with the purchase and maintenance of modern, state-of-the art cargo scanning technologies;
- Crime and corruption at border posts should be contained through installing modern technologies (e.g. CCTV cameras) at inspections points within the border precinct, as well as through encouraging cross-border operators to report incidents of crime and corruption to secure toll-free hotlines.
Road Safety

- Law enforcement visibility should be improved along South African roads. Visible policing influences consumers to be more cautious and to ensure that they practice safety road usage;
- Since incidents involving minibus taxis are increasingly leading to fatalities, stricter regulation and policing of long-distance public transport needs to be applied;
- During busy times of the year (festive and easter seasons) the placing of law enforcement officials within a 100 km radius along targeted national and provincial roads is recommended. This should be complemented by refreshment stations at regular intervals (e.g. every 200 km’s) that provide coffee, energy boosters and test kits for blood-sugar levels;
- The consumption of alcohol and drugs greatly increases the risk of road accidents. Narcotics testing facilities should be set up, equipped with alcohol and drug screening equipment to identify drunk/ intoxicated drivers and to take these drivers off the road;
- Law enforcement officials should impose maximum penalties for serious road traffic offences (e.g. excessive speeding) for example by confiscating the driver’s vehicle. This may require a review of existing legislation to conform with good road safety practices;
- The Department of Transport (DOT) should tie hands with the Department of Education to investigate the feasibility of introducing road safety as a non-examination subject in schools;
- Road safety education programmes should be extended to reach the entire nation. The majority of road accidents are caused by driver behaviour. Jay-walking, drunk driving and speeding are behavioural elements that can be changed through safety education awareness programmes/initiatives;
- In order to initiate long lasting change, improved statistical information on road crashes / fatalities should be captured, processed and circulated amongst all role-players (including the C-BRTA) to measure progress and success, and to identify where interventions are most needed; and
- Government should provide data linkages between key role-players (e.g. SARS, SAPS, RTMC, RTIA, C-BRTA) who are tasked with up-keeping road safety. This intervention will encourage cooperation between role-players and enable the online exchange of road safety data.

Operator Compliance

- Additional C-BRTA inspectors should be deployed along prioritised national and regional roads to conduct joint law enforcement inspections with other law enforcement officials. The deployment of additional RTI resources however, depends on the financial position of the C-BRTA;
➢ Hefty penalties should be imposed upon cross border road transport operators for serious offences. This includes impounding cross-border vehicles and terminating the operator’s (companies) cross border road transport permit upon discretion of the Agency’s Regulatory Committee;

➢ C-BRTA inspectors should use handheld scanning mobile devices that interact with the main central data processor of the Agency. Once data linkages have been established between key public sector role-players, the sharing of real-time information will become common practice. Reliable data on road crashes and fatalities, number of roadside inspections, prosecution and rate of operator compliance is needed to assess the scope of road traffic injuries / operator compliance, to target responses to it, and to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of intervention measures; and

➢ Greater publicity should be given to the Cross-Alive campaign of the C-BRTA to ensure that a greater target market is reached. Through emphasising the main causes of road accidents and proposing road safety measures, the Cross-Alive campaign can improve the seamless flow of cross-border traffic along regional road transport corridors.

The C-BRTA is one of many players operating within the cross border road transport environment. Ultimate success in addressing corridor constraints therefore depends on all role-players working together, agreeing to the report recommendations and working jointly towards enabling proposed cross border road transport reforms.
CHAPTER 1

1. OVERVIEW OF THE REPORT

1.1 Introduction

The Cross-Border Operations Report serves to inform the Cross-Border Road Transport Agency (C-BRTA’s) political principal (Minister of Transport), the Department of Transport (DOT) and other key national (public and private) stakeholders of challenges and developments that impact on the cross-border road transport industry. This report also provides a package of solutions that can be implemented to overcome cross-border constraints. It is anticipated that by providing this information key stakeholders will be able to consider some of the solutions that can be deployed towards enhancing efficiency and productivity of the cross-border road transport industry, thus enabling the industry to play a strategic role in economic growth and development.

To start off, the C-BRTA was established as a regulatory authority under the Cross-Border Road Transport Act No 4 of 1998, as amended, to:

- Improve the unimpeded flow of commercial freight and passenger road transport flows within the SADC;
- Introduce regulated competition in respect of cross-border road passenger transport;
- Reduce operational constraints for the cross-border road transport industry as a whole;
- Liberalise market access progressively in respect of the cross-border road freight transport;
- Strengthen the capacity of the public sector in support of its strategic planning and enabling functions;
- Empower the cross-border road transport industry to maximise business opportunities and to incrementally regulate themselves to improve safety, security, reliability, quality and efficiency of services.

Towards the delivery of its mandate, the Agency performs four core functions. Table 1.1 below illustrates these functions in more detail:
Table 1.1:  C-BRTA Mandate

| Advise | The Minister of Transport, as the need arises or upon request of the Minister, on cross-border road transport policy matters, including strategies to counteract restrictive measures implemented by other countries, the phasing in of measures to liberalise market access, strategies to reduce operational constraints and training needs within the cross road border road transport industry.  

The Agency is also required to advise and provide information to the Minister and the DOT on the negotiation and renegotiation of cross-border road transport agreements. |
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<tr>
<td>Regulate</td>
<td>Providing access to the cross-border road freight and road passenger markets through the issuing of permits</td>
</tr>
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</table>
| Facilitate | i) The establishment of co-operative and consultative relationships and structures between public and private institutions with an interest in cross-border road transport;  
ii) Collection, processing and dissemination of relevant information;  
iii) Provision of training, capacity building and the promotion of entrepreneurship generally and, in particular, in respect of small, medium and micro-enterprises with an interest in cross-border road transport. |
| Undertake | Transport law enforcement |

*Source: Government Gazette. 1998.*

Apart from enhancing the resolution of challenges facing the cross-border road transport industry, this report is also a direct response to some of the Agency’s mandate obligations, based on its legislated mandate. It is therefore envisaged that, by providing the information in this report to stakeholders, the Agency will be executing its mandate on the one hand, while also improving the interests of industry stakeholders.

Further to the Cross-Border Road Transport Act 1998, the functions of the C-BRTA are also derived from other national legislation (e.g. National Land Transport Act No 5 of 2009, National Road Traffic Act No 93 of 1996, the Tourism Act No 3 of 2014), regional instruments (e.g. SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology, Southern African Customs Union Memorandum of Understanding) and bilateral road transport agreements concluded between South Africa and selected SADC Member States (MS). The objectives of these instruments are articulated later in this report.
It is important to know that cross-border road transport plays an important role in facilitating trade flows between MS’s within the SADC. Six countries in the region are landlocked, which means that they rely on coastal countries to access global markets. From this perspective, it becomes imperative that the SADC establishes and maintains an efficient cross-border transport system to reach domestic and global markets.

Additionally, the cross-border road transport industry is dynamic in nature and therefore subjected to constant changes. Due to changes in the macro and market environments, road transport operator’s needs and challenges evolve at a rapid pace, even faster than the pace at which solutions are found and implemented.

Reality on the ground indicates that regulatory authorities in MS’s are unable to respond to operator challenges in an urgent and timeous fashion, owing to a number of reasons that include, regulations which have remained stagnant over the years and a lack of political will by relevant public stakeholders to effectively respond to market needs.

In order to effect change, regulatory authorities should assume a paradigm shift in the way they operate to deliver on their mandates effectively if they are to effectively resolve cross-border road transport challenges. Thus, it is envisaged that this report will provide a platform for engagement on cross-border challenges, with a view to finding lasting solutions and also to present solutions that can be considered towards enhancing the performance of the cross-border road transport industry as a whole.

1.2 Problem Statement

The development of this report was informed by the need to find solutions to a number of constraints (also referred to as impediments or challenges) faced by operators in the domestic and regional environments that undermine the efficiency of the cross-border road transport industry. These challenges include, but are not limited to the following:

- **Inadequate road infrastructure** – Due to insufficient investment in road infrastructure over the years, road conditions within the SADC have deteriorated. Currently missing links along regional road transport corridors and inefficient land borders act as blockages to the seamless flow of traffic across national borders;

- **Impotent soft infrastructure** – Due to stagnation in the regulatory and legislative environments in South Africa and most other MS’s, the regulatory and legislative frameworks are no longer able to effectively respond to changing needs and expectations on the role of transport towards enhancing trade, economic growth and Regional Integration (RI);

- **Road blocks** – In this regard commercial vehicles are stopped at various inter and intra country road blocks even where there is no proof that traffic being transported is of a suspicious nature. This is exacerbated by the mushrooming of illegal road blocks in some MS’s;
- **Inspection procedures** – In this respect, delays in the inspection of commercial vehicles, coupled with cumbersome and costly quality inspection procedures result in impediments and increased costs for commercial road transport operators;

- **Transiting procedures** – The non-harmonised transport rules and standards (e.g. road user charges, cross-border charges and motor insurance schemes) inhibit the seamless movement of traffic along regional road transport corridors; and

- **Customs documentation and administrative procedures** – The non-standardised systems for imports declaration and payment of applicable duty rates, non-acceptance of certificates and trade documentation, incorrect tariff classifications, limited and uncoordinated customs working hours, non-acceptance of certificates of origin, application of discriminatory taxes and other charges on imports originating from MS’s and cumbersome procedures for verifying containerised imports increases the turnaround time and costs for cross-border operators. (TradeMark Southern Africa. 2011: 5).

It is important to note that the cross-border road transport environment is characterised by the above hard and soft infrastructure impediments which negatively impact on the performance of the cross-border road transport industry. The cost of transport, in particular road transport, is directly related to the time taken for a journey. Longer journeys lead to higher production costs and poor productivity at transport operator, industry, country and regional levels. Needless to say, it also leads to poor regional competitiveness.

The severity of this matter necessitates regular interaction between public and private sector role-players and intervention at operational and strategic (highest political) levels to identify and implement solutions that will reduce the said challenges and improve the uninterrupted flow of traffic along regional road transport corridors.

### 1.3 Purpose of this Report

The purpose of this report is to:

- Identify and provide the Minister of Transport and other key national stakeholders with a comprehensive list of road transport challenges (hard and soft) experienced in the cross-border road transport industry, including regional road transport corridors (roads and border posts) that impact negatively on the cross-border road transport industry and which influence the competitiveness of the SADC;

- Inform the Minister of Transport and other relevant stakeholders of initiatives/developments that will influence the cross-border road transport industry; and
Propose recommendations (interventions) which aim to address hard and soft infrastructure challenges in the industry and along regional road transport corridors to enable decision-making bodies to implement solutions that will improve the seamless flow of cross-border road transport movements within the SADC.
2. STATE OF COMMERCIAL BORDER POSTS

2.1 Background

A border post is a facility that provides controlled entry in and out of any country, usually accommodating customs and immigration, as well as other inspection agencies responsible for enforcement of that country’s laws. SADC has many border posts of varying size and volumes of traffic. Some small border posts (usually non-commercial) handle persons only and may have only immigration officers handling all functions. Others handle goods and customs officers may act on behalf of various border agencies.

Geographically, South Africa is located on the Southern tip of the African continent. The greater part of its western, southern and eastern frontiers is surrounded by the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. On the northern side however, South Africa has an extensive land borderline, which it shares with six neighbouring countries: Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Swaziland. Embedded within South Africa and surrounded by three of its provinces is the Kingdom of Lesotho.

The approximate distance of South Africa’s land borderline is 3,500 kilometres. While South Africa has 53 land ports of entry (border posts), there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that there are other “unofficial” entry points into the country.

Table 2.1 provides information on the countries with which South Africa shares borders, as well as the names and status of such borders.
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<th>Land Border Crossings</th>
<th>Name of Border Post</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<td><strong>South Africa – Lesotho Borders</strong></td>
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<td>Commercial</td>
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<td>Ficksburg Bridge</td>
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<td>Peka Bridge</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rietfontein</td>
<td>Non Commercial</td>
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<td>Mata Mata</td>
<td>Non Commercial</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>South Africa – Botswana borders</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kopfontein</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ramatlabama</td>
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<tr>
<td>Skilpadshuk</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Groblersbrug / Bridge</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Twee Rivieren</td>
<td>Non Commercial</td>
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<td>Middelputts</td>
<td>Non Commercial</td>
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<td>McCarthy’s Rest</td>
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<td>Makopong</td>
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<td>Bray</td>
<td>Non Commercial</td>
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<td>Swartkopfontein</td>
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<td>Derdepoort</td>
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<td>Stockpoort</td>
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<td>Platjan</td>
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<td>Pontdrif</td>
<td>Non Commercial</td>
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<td><strong>South Africa – Zimbabwe borders</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Beitbridge</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
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<td><strong>South Africa Mozambique borders</strong></td>
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<td>Lebombo</td>
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<td>Giriyondo</td>
<td>Non Commercial</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kosi Bay</td>
<td>Non Commercial</td>
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</table>

*Source: Table created for study*
Figure 2.1 depicts the geographical location of border posts in relation to other ports of entry in South Africa.

**Figure 2.1: Geographical location of border posts in relation to other ports of entry in South Africa**

Source: Department of Home Affairs. 2014, as amended.

Land borders can either stimulate, or impede traffic movements between member countries. Unfortunately, the majority of border posts in the SADC are characterised by both hard and soft infrastructure deficiencies, which results in significant time delays for road transport operators at border posts and increase the cost of doing business in Africa.

Further to the above, inefficient land borders discourage member states from trading with each other. This trend is reflected in statistics which indicate that intra-Regional Economic Community (REC) imports and exports account for a mere 10 percent of SADC’s total imports and exports, indicating that the majority of imports and exports are obtained from, and destined for other continents. (Hartzenberg, T. 2011).
Border post inefficiencies in the SADC have created a situation whereby land borders are regarded as the single most critical block to intra-regional trade and travel. The reality is that the crossing of land borders can add hours, or even days to transit times (SADC RIDMP 2010:55). In a study conducted by the African Development Bank (2012:5) into border posts it is found that the waiting time for a truck to cross a border post in Africa could range from 3 minutes to 2.8 days.

Further to the above, it is not surprising that Africa’s logistics costs are above 17% (and rising) of the overall delivery cost of goods, while the rest of the world has driven cost down to between 8-9%. (http://www.translogafrica.com). This tendency reveals the dire need to address impediments experienced at land borders in an urgent fashion.

This chapter presents a high-level overview of main infrastructure challenges experienced at South Africa’s commercial border posts. Furthermore, it reflects on initiatives (both nationally and regionally) aimed at improving the efficiency of strategic border posts. Lastly, it reflects on the role that the C-BRTA can play in facilitating the uninterrupted flow of traffic across national land borders to stimulate intra-regional trade flows.

2.2 Challenges experienced at Border Posts

2.2.1 Inadequate Infrastructure

For the purposes of this discussion, infrastructure challenges at border posts are categorised under hard and soft infrastructure constraints.

a) Hard infrastructure Challenges

Hard infrastructure refers to physical nodes (e.g. buildings) and links (e.g. roads) which are required to successfully operate and manage border posts. SADC Border posts are marred with inadequate hard infrastructure, which include but are not limited to:

- Inadequate approach roads to border posts;
- Insufficient parking for vehicles;
- Absence of dedicated freight and passenger lanes;
- Absence of signage to direct traffic within the border precinct;
- Absence of weighbridges;
- Insufficient storage space for confiscated goods;
- Lack of incinerators to burn unwanted products; and
- Limited facilities to store confiscated / impounded vehicles.
Hard infrastructure constraints are particularly noted at the Beitbridge border post where the road leading to the border post only has two lanes travelling in each direction. In light of the fact that the Beitbridge border post is the busiest regional transit link in Southern and Eastern Africa, the fact that most of South Africa’s road freight to countries to the North is being bottlenecked into a single line is a critical issue that requires urgent attention.

The road infrastructure situation at Beitbridge is aggravated by the fact that trucks share a lane with public buses. Border officials often let too many buses through at a time, causing severe delays within the border, as passengers need to be cleared by Immigration. A large taxi rank is situated at the entrance to the border post to service the foot traffic coming across the old river bridge, while a number of informal traders and hawkers are set up right at entrance to the border post. The taxis often block the road and make it difficult for trucks to get through.

b) Soft Infrastructure Challenges

Soft infrastructure challenges include rules and regulations governing the various systems, procedures, processes, institutions and human capital in respect to cross-border road transport movements. Aside from weaknesses in the actual physical structures constituting infrastructure, a number of administrative issues tamp down intra-regional trade flows in the SADC.

Of specific importance is a lack of consistency and efficiency in the application of customs processes. Cumbersome customs documentation and procedures are one of the most worrisome issues in the SADC region. World Bank reports indicate that the document requirements accompanying each Shoprite truck as it crosses a SADC border can be up to 1,600 documents. (Woodrow Wilson School of International and Public Affairs. 2011: 27). This kind of cost and effort would be difficult to meet for small businesses in member states, thereby diminishing their ability to trade intra-regionally.

Other soft infrastructure challenges that prevent the unimpeded flow of traffic across SADC borders include the following:

- Lack of adequate and efficient border management and governance systems;
- Limited cooperation and coordination between border post stakeholders on both sides of the border, resulting in the duplication of processes;
- Complex documentation and inspection systems for cross-border road transport operators;
- Bad work ethic exists amongst border stakeholders;
- Lack of system process integration;
- Lack of proper understanding of processes, systems and documents by clients and officials alike;
- Poor communication systems and information sharing;
- Language barriers at certain border posts - Mozambique border officials communicate in Portuguese, whereas South African border officials speak English; and
- Excessive red-tape.

2.2.2 Ranking Facilities at Border Posts

The existence of ranking facilities at various border entrances in the SADC region where taxi’s (many which do not have cross-border permits) rank to offload and load cross border passengers disrupt traffic movements at border posts. Once off-loaded, passenger cross over on foot through the South African and member state countries borders to connect with public transport on the other side of the border.

Apart from aggravating congestion at border posts, this practice also compromises border control operations, security and integrity. The parking of taxis at the border entrance to drop off and collect passengers has given rise to many accidents over the years. Furthermore it exacerbates and creates opportunities for criminal activities such as smuggling and robbery.

Section 75 (2) of the National Land Transport Act No 5 of 2009 (NLTA) deals with the interface between public transport and cross-border transport. It states that an operator may not drop off passengers within a 2 kilometre radius of an international border where it is clear that such passenger(s) intend to cross the border into another country. Furthermore, no operator may pick up passengers within the 2 kilometre radius when it is clear that passengers originated from the neighbouring country, unless that operator is the holder of a valid cross-border road transport permit.

The occurrence of illegal taxi operators at border entrances results in tension since taxi operators in possession of a valid cross-border road transport permit feel that illegal operators interfere with their market share. It also serves as deterrent to encouraging cross-border road transport operators to comply with the law.

2.2.3 Operating Hours at Commercial Border posts

The majority of border posts in the SADC are not open 24 hours per day. Only a few border posts in the region (e.g. Beitbridge and Maseru bridge) operate 24 hours per day, all year round. However, the overall impact of this initiative is minimised by the fact that the clearing of goods only takes place until 22:00 at night. Many cross-border operators engage in reckless driving (e.g. speeding) to arrive at the border
post in time to clear goods before the border closes. This tendency impacts negatively on road safety along South African roads leading to border posts.

The queuing of trucks at commercial border posts after 22:00 result in increased theft and criminal activities. This practice also aggravates early morning traffic congestion since new traffic has to wait until the backlog of traffic has been cleared. This problem is particularly acute at the Beitbridge and Lebombo border posts where vehicle queues often reach over five kilometres during peak periods of year. (http://africanbusinessmagazine.com/uncategorised/sadc-nightmare-for-commercial-truckers/).

### 2.2.4 Power Shortages at Border Posts

Power shortages at inland borders also contribute to delays at land borders. At the Zimbabwean side of the Beitbridge border post, electricity supply is down for a few hours on most days. Although most border posts are equipped with generators, they are often poorly maintained and too small to service all electricity needs. For example, the generators used by the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) cannot generate enough power to supply electricity to its officers and the truck scanners at the same time. (Non-tariff barriers at Beitbridge / Case Study 07:71).

The automation of customs processes is dependent on reliable power supplies. Since all customs entries are done electronically, no entries can be processed when power supply is cut during which the entire process comes to a standstill.

### 2.2.5 Absence of Cargo Scanners

The absence of cargo scanners at commercial border posts poses a risk of illicit smuggling of goods through inland borders. An increase in the volume of traffic passing through South Africa’s land borders in recent years has put tremendous pressure on the ability to enforce South Africa’s national laws, while at the same time facilitating trade movements.

In practice, freight vehicles moving through border posts are being inspected physically, which adds to the cost and time that an operator spent at a border post. Furthermore the inspection of consignments increases the likelihood of goods being damaged or stolen.

Investment in cargo scanning technologies will serve as a force multiplier and compliment the work of customs officers and other law enforcement agencies in guarding member states from illicit trade. Furthermore, state of the art technologies can enhance revenue collection due to faster clearance times, while also improving the turnaround time for transporters.
2.2.6 Non-existence of Automatic Number Plate Recognition

SARS is responsible for collecting, processing and disseminating information on vehicles which enter and exit South Africa. Although the data assist public sector role-players in their strategic planning activities, the data collected by SARS is not disaggregated. Currently it is only categorised into two vehicle classes: light and heavy vehicles.

The information captured by SARS does not help the C-BRTA to distinguish cross border vehicles by their vehicle class (e.g. trucks, buses and taxis). This is mainly due to the non-existence of automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) technology at commercial border posts which deprives the C-BRTA access to cross border traffic flow real-time data.

2.2.7 Training and Lack of Sufficient Staff

The limitation of skilled resources at border posts severely constraint the efficiency of land borders. Various public sectors stakeholders, operating in silos, are deployed at inland border posts. Annual training plans are compiled separately by the different border stakeholders, and joint training is the exception rather that the rule.

Co-operation in training is important because it can have an impact on all other areas of co-operation. Training of border officials can range from formal courses provided at tertiary institutions (e.g. universities) to regular seminars and workshops during which technical know-how is exchanged between border agencies.

2.2.8 Crime at Border Posts

Another issue contributing to delays at border posts is the prevalence of crime at border posts. Transporters and agents operating at the border report high crime rates, ranging from petty theft (e.g. criminals breaking into vehicles at night to steal the drivers valuables), to serious armed robbery. Cases have been reported where border post officials have been held up by organised, heavily armed criminals who know that officials hold large amounts of cash.

Although customs officials oversee border post inspections, casual labourers open and close truck compartments and move cargo around at the Beitbridge border post. In the absence of proper security systems at this border it becomes easy for anyone to gain access to the truck inspection yard. Although the Beitbridge border operates for 24 hours a day, transporters and agents seldom permit their drivers to enter the border post after 20:00 because of the high likelihood that cargo will be stolen while the truck is being inspected or waits in one of the many queues. Due to this impediment, the Beibridge border effectively runs only during daylight hours since transporters cannot run the risk of their cargo being stolen.
On 19 November 2015 the Hawks division from the South African Policy Services (SAPS) in South Africa arrested 16 border police officials and 3 home affairs officials at the Kopfontein border post between Botswana and South Africa. The suspects, who were arrested while on duty, are linked to a combined 54 charges of fraud and corruption. Corruption charges revolve around smugglers bringing counterfeit cigarettes into South Africa (http://southafricatoday.net/south-africa-news/border-officials-arrested-for-helping-smugglers-cross-border/).

2.3 Border Post Developments and Initiatives aimed at Improving Cross Border Movements

2.3.1 National Initiatives related to Cross Border Road Transport Movements

a) South African Revenue Service Customs Modernisation Programme

Despite their proximity to each other at land borders, most customs administrations do not exchange information effectively with their counterparts on the other side of the border. The manual re-entry of customs declaration data is associated with an increased chance of human error, delays in preparing and processing declarations data, delays in clearance due to data errors, and the associated increase in overall trade costs.

The South African Revenue Service (SARS) customs modernisation programme was officially launched in South Africa in 2009 to streamline customs clearance processes. This programme entails the electronic processing of customs declarations, coupled with automated risk assessments to differentiate between low-risk and high-risk trade. Essentially, these changes aim to facilitate trade by speeding up the movement of trucks through land borders, replacing stamps and paper with electronic processing and using resources more effectively by centralising declaration processing.

SARS has taken a pragmatic view towards implementation. The main achievements of the customs modernisation initiative are presented in Figure 2.2.
As evident from the above figure, the SARS modernisation process has yielded in a number of achievements, which include:

- A reduction in the physical inspection of goods from 8 hours to 2 hours;
- Quick real time processing turnaround time;
- Dramatic increase in the number of declarations received and processed electronically.

Further to the above it should be noted that although customs reforms yielded significant time savings in the clearing of goods on the South African side of the border, it does not make adequate provision for integration with other South African, or regional border management processes. As a result the overall impact of this reform has been limited since time savings accrued by South African operators are lost due to time delays associated with the clearing of goods by other border agencies.
In order to extend the impact of the customs modernisation initiative over national borders, SARS has been engaging with customs authorities in member states to find the most appropriate solution to exchanging customs information electronically between relevant authorities.

In early 2012, SARS formally initiated the Information Technology (IT) Connectivity initiative in collaboration with Swaziland under the guidance of the World Customs Organisation (WCO) and the South African Customs Union (SACU). This initiative has yielded the following results:

- Adoption of the WCO’s approach to implement regional data exchange between customs authorities;
- Agreement on the data elements to exchange (export and transit declaration data) and the technical message infrastructure;
- Agreement on the messaging language;
- Successful exchange of test data; and
- Agreement on the structure of a unique consignment reference number.

Further to the above, SARS and the Mozambique Revenue Authority have engaged in a data exchange project since the mid-2012. This partnership has yielded the following results:

- Reaching of consensus on the communication method and message exchange structure; and
- Successful exchange of test data.

b) **Border Management Agency**

The Border Control Operational Coordinating Committee (BCOCC), under the leadership of SARS was mandated by Cabinet in 2007 to oversee and coordinate the functions of all state agencies operating at the country's borders. The BCOCC mission is to facilitate inter-agency cooperation and coordination to enable smooth and easy transit across the ports of entry for legitimate traffic.

In the absence of binding legislation, the BCOCC has not succeeded in establishing domestic integration amongst border stakeholders. The coordination model made it voluntary for Departments to participate in border management coordination structures, such as the Border Control Operational Coordination Committee. The weaknesses of this approach resulted in Cabinet’s decision to adopt a lead agency model as the most appropriate model for harmonising and integrating border management functions, processes and resources into a single lead department.
The lead agency model goes hand in hand with the establishment of a single authority, titled the Border Management Agency (BMA) that will balance cross-border travel, trade facilitation and national security imperatives, within the context of South Africa’s regional, African and international obligations.

In 2013, Cabinet designated the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) as the lead department in the establishment of an integrated BMA for South Africa. In August 2015, Cabinet approved the introduction of the BMA Bill, 2015 into Parliament.

In essence the function of the BMA Bill is “To provide for the establishment, organisation, regulation and control of the Border Management Agency; to provide for the transfer, assignment, and designation of law enforcement border related functions to the Border Management Agency; and to provide for matters connected thereto.” (http://mpoverello.com/category/border-management-agency/).

The BMA is set to be established by April 2017. However, the establishment of the BMA is fully dependent on the enactment of the BMA Bill in 2016. Although government may not have control over the Parliamentary process, it remains hopeful that the BMA Bill will be processed with the urgency it deserves.

It is anticipated that a single authority for border law enforcement will result in more cost-effective services, enhanced security and better management of the border environment. At the same time, delays at border posts will be reduced with a resulting decrease in the cost of doing business in the SADC region.

On 22 February 2015, border officials at the Skilpadshek Port of Entry relocated to a new facility which was constructed in response to various service delivery challenges caused by infrastructure challenges experiences at the old port. The new facility allows for segmentation of traffic, separate parking of commercial vehicles, light vehicles, buses and pedestrians, sufficient search areas for different vehicles and adequate shelter for officials to conduct their duties under any weather conditions.

Further to infrastructure improvements at the Skilpadshek border post, this border post has been selected for piloting the proposed integrated border management system. The piloting process commenced in October 2015 and is still on-going.

Progress towards establishing the BMA is noted in the establishment of a local Steering Committee that will replace the local BCOCC. Meanwhile, the C-BRTA participates in various task teams of the BMA.

**c) Musina Traffic Control Centre**

The Beitbridge Border Post between South Africa and Zimbabwe is regarded as one of Africa’s gateways to the world. Large volumes of heavy vehicles pass through this border on a daily basis carrying export goods from African countries to the Durban harbour, as well as imports from the rest of the world to African countries to the North of South Africa.
The large number of foreign vehicles entering South Africa underpins the importance of a Traffic Control Centre (TCC) in close proximity to the Beitbridge border post to monitor overloading, as well as to check the roadworthiness of vehicles. The Musina TCC is strategically placed on the N1 highway, located approximately 5 kilometres south from the border with Zimbabwe.

The following vehicles are screened for overloading and vehicle fitness at the Musina TCC:

- Foreign vehicles entering South Africa;
- South African registered heavy vehicles, busses and taxis entering the country;
- Heavy vehicles, buses and taxis leaving South Africa.

Figure 2.3: Aerial View of the Musina Traffic Control Centre

Source: MAGNA BC.

The TCC plays an important role in reducing congestion and bottlenecks at the Beitbridge border post, since a number of law enforcement checks are conducted at this facility. A steady increase in heavy vehicle flows along the North South Corridor (NSC) in recent years however, created bottlenecks within the TCC due to limited space to conduct inspections at this facility. In order to manage this problem, priority is given to the weighing of heavy goods vehicles during peak periods. This practice creates an uneven playing field since certain categories of heavy vehicles (buses, light delivery vehicles and minibus taxis) are exempted from law enforcement checks at the Musina TCC certain times of year.

Originally the intention was that C-BRTA inspectors would be positioned at the Musina TCC on a permanent basis to perform cross border checks. Due to the space constraints at this facility and acknowledging the fact that minibus taxis, light delivery vehicles and cross border buses are not always subjected to law
enforcement checks at the TCC, C-BRTA inspectors still perform cross border checks at an inspection site on the outskirts of Musina, on the corner of the N1 and Pontdrift roads.

2.3.2 Regional Initiatives related to Border Posts

a) Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan

The Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan (RIDMP), approved by the SADC Summit in 2012 is regarded as the region’s blueprint for infrastructure development and coordination. Diagnostic studies have illustrated that infrastructure at various border posts in the region has become inadequate to accommodate current trade and transport volumes through these borders. As a result, road transport operators experience significant time delays at border posts.

The classic SADC border post model is a “two stop” facility where each country has border facilities on its side of the border where travellers and transporters are required to undergo duplicate border clearance processes on both sides of the border. This situation is compounded by the regional customs practice of demanding the clearance of goods at the border post, as opposed to the system of releasing goods at final destination or inland hubs away from the border.

An exception is found in South Africa where SARS clear goods electronically. The impact of this reform however, has been limited due to a lack of incorporation of and the interaction by other import and export related agencies and role-players in the SARS modernisation process. In order to extend the impact of the customs modernisation initiative to SADC member states, SARS is continuing engagements with customs authorities in member countries to find a solution to exchanging customs information electronically, instead of manually.

Based on research data, it still takes approximately 20 hours for a freight vehicle to move through the Beitbridge border post, despite the roll-out of the SARS customs modernisation programme at this border post, emphasising the fact that reforms conducted in isolation have a limited impact.

The RIDMP identifies eighteen (18) border post projects for the region, which all revolve around the establishment of One Stop Border Posts (OSBP’s). OSBP’s is a concept for border management efficiency improvement which have been adopted by SADC that entails joint control and management of border crossing facilities by border agents of member state countries, using shared facilities, systems and streamlined procedures.

Figure 2.4 below illustrates the location of prioritised OSBP’s in the SADC region. These projects have been selected on the basis of:
➢ Trade and traffic volumes through land borders;
➢ Member States interest and commitment;
➢ Strategic importance in the regional trade and transport value chains; and
➢ Sequencing of reforms along strategic corridors.

**Figure 2.4: Prioritised OSBP Projects**

![Map of Southern Africa showing prioritised OSBP Projects.](source)


Table 2.2 illustrates the progress made to date in developing OSBP’s in the SADC.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corridor</th>
<th>Border Crossing</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **NSC**  | Chirundu        | Zambia / Zimbabwe | - MoU signed in 2008.  
- OSBP infrastructure, processes and staffing in place.  
- Physically facilities re-designed and constructed.  
- OSBP law in place in both countries.  
- Officially opened in December 2009 as an OSBP. |
| Kazungula | Zambia / Botswana | - Construction started in 2014 and is projected to take 4 years.  
- The project includes design and construction of a fixed road and rail bridge to replace the ferry, construction of OSBP facilities on both sides and trade and transport facilitation.  
- A project office has been established by Botswana / Zambia and is operational in Kasane, Botswana. |
| Beitbridge | Zimbabwe / South Africa | - Draft MoU developed.  
- The South Africa / Zimbabwe joint institutional structure to manage the Border Efficiency Management Project has been established at operational technical, senior officials and ministerial levels – but little progress has been made.  
- An Action Plan has been developed and adopted but not implemented. |
| Kasumbalesa | Democratic Republic of the Congo / Zambia | - Several diagnostics studies have been conducted, but never fully implemented.  
- No integrated OSBP plan is in place.  
- In Zambia the outsourcing of infrastructure provision and management has been reversed.  
- A Joint Programme under agreed MoU and institutions need to be developed to ensure a coordinated approach.  
- The critical border crossing is a major bottleneck in the region. |
<p>| Martin’s Drift / Grobler’s Bridge | Botswana / South Africa | - No joint plan has been developed for this OSBP. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corridor</th>
<th>Border Crossing</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trans Caprivi</strong></td>
<td>Katima Mililo / Wenela</td>
<td>Namibia / Zambia</td>
<td>➢ Feasibility study completed in 2007.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Implementation of OSBP conversion measures is slow.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ No institutional arrangements are in place.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ No funding support exists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Cluster to coordinate trade and transport facilitation along the route are in place and operational coordinated by the Walvis Bay Corridor Group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trans Cunene</strong></td>
<td>Oshikango / Santa Clara</td>
<td>Namibia / Angola</td>
<td>➢ Feasibility study completed in 2007, funded by JICA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Implementation pending funding and establishment of institutional structure and adoption of Action Plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trans Kalahari</strong></td>
<td>Trans Kalahari / Mamuno</td>
<td>Namibia / Botswana</td>
<td>➢ Feasibility study completed for Trans Kalahari Mamuno border crossing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Institutional arrangements are set up;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Implementation plan developed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ OSBP policy and legislation under development, including operating manuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nacala</strong></td>
<td>Mchinji / Mwami Mandimba / Chiponde</td>
<td>Zambia / Malawi Mozambique / Malawi</td>
<td>➢ OSBP are included in the Nacala corridor road studies project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Construction of OSBP is expected to commence in 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maputo</strong></td>
<td>Ressano Garcia / Lebombo</td>
<td>Mozambique / South Africa</td>
<td>➢ MoU signed in 2007;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Draft legal documents ready and pending review and adoption.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dar-es-Salaam</strong></td>
<td>Tunduma / Nakonde</td>
<td>Tanzania / Zambia</td>
<td>➢ Zambia and Tanzania have established committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ MoU signed, institutional framework and a joint work plan are in place;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Zambia is construction new facilities on its side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Songwe / Kasumulo</td>
<td>Tanzania / Malawi</td>
<td>➢ Feasibility studies planned;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Currently work is undertaken to establish ICT connectivity between the two customs agencies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: SADC. June 2015*
It is evident from the information displayed in Table 2.2 that prioritised OSBP projects are in various stages of development. Most projects appear to be still in the planning/conceptual phases; whereas some projects (e.g. Chirundu) have been completed (implemented).

The Chirundu border post between Zimbabwe and Zambia is already operating as an OSBP. Furthermore, the Lebombo/Ressano Garcia border crossing between South Africa and Mozambique will be implemented as an OSBP in the near future. To date, the governments from South Africa and Mozambique have signed the OSBP agreement, which stipulates that all cargo utilising the Lebombo/Ressano Garcia border post will be cleared at KM4 in future. Since stakeholders from both countries will be operating from KM4, they are currently undergoing training to facilitate the speedy clearance of freight at this location.

Improvements in the functional operation of the Lebombo/Ressano Garcia border crossing, includes the following:

- The bilateral removal of visa requirements between Mozambique and South Africa for nationals from these countries;
- The extension of operating hours at the border to 12 hours per day for people and 16 hours per day for goods; and
- The extension of border post operating hours to 24 hours per day over the festive season.

Irrespective of the fact that limited progress has been made towards transforming the Beitbridge border post into a OSBP, the government of Zimbabwe has re-emphasised its commitment in August 2015 towards speeding up processes at this border to establish a one-stop border post with South Africa. This development clearly illustrates that the success of OSBP’s is dependent upon the willingness of border agencies on both sides of the border to cooperate in developing and implementing coordinated control systems and procedures that would result in improved traffic flows across land borders.

The C-BRTA stays up to speed with border-related developments through participating in national and/or regional meetings and platforms (e.g. BCOCC discussions). Various stakeholders participate in BCOCC meetings which serve as platform for discussing border post constraints, proposing reforms and tracking progress on border post developments.

The C-BRTA also participates in the BMA Steering Committee and Beitbridge Efficiency Management System Committee discussions. The latter is a sub-committee of the BCOCC. This committee proposes that the integration of systems should precede the integration of infrastructure and services as a platform for the exchange of ideas amongst public sector stakeholders.
2.4 The Role of the C-BRTA in Driving Border Post Reforms

Border post reforms all centre on the establishment of OSBP’s in the SADC region. Upon completion, OSBPs will facilitate traffic movements through inland borders; inter alia through the use of shared facilities and streamlined border procedures.

Although prioritised border post projects are in various stages of completion, the majority of such projects are still in the planning phases. A lack of political will amongst member states to implement border post projects, insufficient funds at member state level to enable execution (construction), the absence of national and regional implementation institutions and the absence of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms at national and regional level are cited as contributory factors to this trend.

The C-BRTA is only one of many role-players in the cross border road transport environment. The successful implementation of border post reforms, notably the establishment of OSBP’s, is therefore dependent upon the cooperation of all role-players, notably the Department of Public Works (owner of property), DHA, Customs, Department of Health and the SAPS.

Despite the fact that the C-BRTA does not have a physical presence at strategic border posts, the Agency participates in national and regional platforms which provide a means for the exchange of information and the sharing of grievances/ideas.

It is of utmost importance that the C-BRTA exercises its Advisory and Facilitating roles during these engagements to:

- Provide *strategic support* and advice, based on empirical research, to national and regional role-players, to educate them on the collective benefits that can be obtained for the region, member states and cross-border road transport operators, once the duplication of processes have been eliminated at land borders through the establishment of OSBP’s. Trust is easier to build when facts are shared with all relevant parties; and

- *Facilitate* national and regional stakeholder interaction in supporting the drive towards implementing regionally prioritised transport (border post) projects. Stakeholder engagements provide a platform for the exchange of information, sharing of grievances, measuring of project progress and identification of challenges (gaps).
2.5 Conclusion

The SADC has many border posts of varying sizes. The case is no different for South Africa. Due to its extensive land borderline, the country has 53 commercial land ports of entry (border posts). While border posts should facilitate the free movement of traffic and only act as stop points for good reason, border posts in the SADC region act as trade security, instead of trade facilitation points.

Currently SADC land borders are characterised by various hard and soft infrastructure, and operational constraints. Impediments such as inadequate approach roads to border posts, inadequate parking for vehicles within the border precinct, no separation and freight and passenger traffic, limited cooperation and coordination amongst border post officials and complex documentation and inspection systems are examples of hard and soft infrastructure constraints that result in excessive delays for cross-border road transport operators.

In addition to the above-mentioned infrastructure constraints, operational impediments such as the incorrect placing of ranking facilities, power shortages at border posts, limited operating hours of border posts, absence of cargo scanners, crime and shortage of trained staff impede the seamless movement of traffic across national borders, thereby increasing the cost of doing business in the SADC region.

In response to the above infrastructure and operational impediments, a number of initiatives have been implemented at national and regional level in recent years to improve the functioning of border posts. As far as South African initiatives are concerned, plans to establish a single BMA by April 2017 is still on track, depending the enactment of the BMA Bill in 2016.

The belief exists that a single integrated authority for border law enforcement will result in more cost-effective services, enhanced security and better management of the border environment, which will result in a reduction in delays for cross-border road transport operators.

Regionally, a number of OSBP projects have been prioritised for implementation in a phased manner over the 2012 and 2027 period. The implementation of border post projects however, requires major commitment of sustainable financial and human resources. This poses a challenge since most member states do not possess the technical or financial means to implement projects at member state level. In addition, a lack of political will amongst member states to implement projects and the absence of national and regional implementation institutions and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms stand in the way of implementing strategic cross-border infrastructure projects within specified time frames.

The C-BRTA is one of many role-players in the cross-border road transport environment. Ultimate success in implementing OSBP projects therefore depends on the willingness of border agencies on both sides of the border to cooperate in
developing and implementing coordinated control systems and procedures that would result in improved traffic flows through inland borders.

The C-BRTA can influence the timeous implementation of OSBP projects through exercising the following functions:

- Advising (educating) all parties of the collective benefits for the region through implementing prioritised border post projects within specified time frames; and

- Creating a political dialogue between SADC member states whereby the C-BRTA can facilitate national and regional stakeholder interaction to monitor project progress based on agreed targets, detect impediments (gaps) and develop interventions to get delayed projects back on track.
3. ROAD SAFETY AND OPERATOR COMPLIANCE

3.1 Background

More than 1.2 million people die on the world’s roads annually, while between 20 and 50 million suffer non-fatal injuries. In most regions of the world this epidemic of road traffic injuries is still increasing. (World Health Organization. 2009).

Globally, South Africa is singled out as one of the worst performing countries in the world as far as road safety is concerned. According to estimates released by the World Health Organisation (WHO), South Africa’s estimated road traffic death rate amounts to 33.2 persons per 100,000 population. While this figure is comparable to other low income countries, such as Ghana (29.6), middle income countries (Brazil at 18.3 and China at 16.5) have significantly lower scores. High income countries’ score ranges between 5-15 persons per 100,000 population. (Department of Transport, 2012: 34).

During financial year (FY) 2014, 12 700 people died on South African roads. (Department of Transport. 30 December 2015:9). Of the total 1 535 people were killed during the festive season. Despite increased road safety campaigns and law enforcement visibility over the 2015 festive season, the preliminary festive season report for December 2015 / January 16 reveals that 1 755 South Africans were killed on South African roads. This figure reflects an increase of 14.3% over the 2014-15 festive season. A closer look at the road crashes and fatalities over the 2015/16 festive season depict the following trends:

- Small motor vehicles accounted for 47.9% of total road crashes, followed by light delivery vehicles at 22.7%, minibuses or kombis at 10.1% and trucks at 4.8%;

- The majority of people who died were passengers at 38.3%, followed by pedestrians at 34.9%. Drivers contributed over 23.9% of road fatalities and cyclists 2.8%;

- Between the age group 25 to 39 years, drivers contributed to 47.9% of road fatalities, followed by passengers and pedestrians at 38.5% and 34.3% respectively. Children aged from 0-4 contributed 10.4% of pedestrian deaths;

- The gender most affected by males with a contribution of 74.4% to total fatalities. Females contributed 25.2% of the fatalities; and

- The gender of 0.4% of the people was undetermined because they were burned beyond recognition.
The SADC region faces similar problems with regard to road safety. The road networks in various member states have a poor safety record by world standards. Furthermore, the quality of road signage and especially road markings is seen to contribute to the lawlessness and high crash rates in the region.

In response to the rising road safety pandemic, the global community of nations adopted and launched the United Nations Decade of Action (UNDA) for Road Safety 2011-2020 in May 2011. The Decade of Action was endorsed by more than one hundred governments and United Nations (UN) member states with the goal to “stabilise and reduce” the projected level of global road fatalities by 2020, from the 2010 baseline. The objective is to save 5 million lives globally and prevent up to 50 million serious injuries over a ten year period. South Africa is a signatory to the UNDA.

Against this background, chapter 3 is structured around the following themes:

- Firstly, an in-depth discussion is conducted into road safety in South Africa. The main factors causing road accidents, as well as initiatives implemented to date to improve road safety in South Africa and the SADC region will be discussed. Thereafter feedback will be provided on the success of such initiatives; and

- Secondly, operator compliance is examined. Failure of drivers to comply with basic road safety regulations is regarded as a main contributory factor to road accidents. Literature sources reveal that the high level of lawlessness (South Africa and SADC) is underpinned by a general lack of targeted and effective law enforcement. The C-BRTA, as an important role-player in the cross-border road transport environment conducts targeted roadside inspections to ensure compliance to all cross-border legislation. Meanwhile, the data released by the Road Transport Inspectorate (RTI) Division of the Agency will be analysed to determine the rate of compliance by cross border road transport operators thereby measuring progress and success.

### 3.2 Road Accident Review and Analysis

#### 3.2.1 Overview

The South African population has shown a steady growth in the last decade, rising from 47.6 million in 2005 to approximately 54 million people in 2014 (Figure 3.1). Simultaneously, the number of registered driver license holders increased from 7.5 million to 11.1 million over the same period (Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.1:  South African Population Growth

An increase in the number of drivers licenses issued has led to an increase in the number of registered vehicles on South African roads as evident from Table 3.1 below.
Table 3.1: Total Number of Motorised Vehicles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vehicle Type</th>
<th>December 2012</th>
<th>December 2013</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motorcars</td>
<td>6 110 660</td>
<td>6 376 733</td>
<td>4.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minibuses</td>
<td>285 858</td>
<td>289 078</td>
<td>1.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buses</td>
<td>51 686</td>
<td>54 494</td>
<td>5.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>355 632</td>
<td>367 244</td>
<td>3.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDV’s – Bakkies</td>
<td>2 152 779</td>
<td>2 228 559</td>
<td>3.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>342 131</td>
<td>350 503</td>
<td>2.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other and Unknown</td>
<td>224 050</td>
<td>226 620</td>
<td>1.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>9 552 796</strong></td>
<td><strong>9 893 231</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.89%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Department of Transport. Undated.*

From the statistics displayed in figures 3.1 and 3.2 it becomes apparent that an increase in the population has resulted in an increase in the number of driver’s licences issued. More vehicles on roads increase the risk of road accidents, as supported by literature sources which reveal that the total number of road deaths is related to both population and motorisation levels within a country.

The information displayed in Table 3.1 reveals the following facts:

- An increase of 3.89% in the total number of registered motorised vehicles from 9.52 million at the end of 2012 to approximately 9.89 million in December 2013;

- On a percentage basis the biggest increase was in the number of buses with a 5.43% increase from 51 686 in December 2013 to 54 494 at the end of 2013.

Table 3.2 provides data on road crashes and fatalities in South Africa over the period 2010 to 2014. It is important to note that the primary source of data used for the analysis is the RTMC, which is not the only institution collecting road traffic data in South Africa. The data may therefore be incomplete, but it still serves an important purpose in identifying trends on road crashes and fatalities.
### Table 3.2: Number of Fatal Crashes and Fatalities in South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Fatal Crashes</th>
<th>Fatalities</th>
<th>Average Fatalities per Fatal Crash</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>10 837</td>
<td>13 967</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>11 228</td>
<td>13 954</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 (approximate figures)</td>
<td>11 100</td>
<td>13 800</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 (approximate figures)</td>
<td>10 100</td>
<td>12 000</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 (approximate figures)</td>
<td>10 200</td>
<td>12 700</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Transport. February 2016.

The information displayed in Table 3.2 shows a decreasing trend in both fatal road crashes and people killed between 2010 and 2014. The decreasing trend in both statistics needs to be sustained and substantially enhanced, if South Africa is to meet the target set by the National Development Plan (NDP) for 2030. One of the first challenges is to reduce road traffic fatalities by 500 per annum. (Department of Transport. 2016: 26). Section 3.4 presents information on road safety initiatives currently undertaken in South Africa to improve road safety in the country.

### 3.2.2 Contributory Factors to Road Accidents in South Africa

History has revealed that fatal road accidents in South Africa are caused by three factors – human, vehicle road and environmental factors, as depicted in Figure 3.3 below.
Figure 3.3: Contributory Factors to Fatal Road Crashes

Source: Department of Transport. 2011

a) Human Factors

The majority of road accidents are caused by human factors, such as:

- Pedestrians’ jay-walking, not using pedestrian facilities or ignoring traffic signals and signs;
- Excessive speeding and ignoring speed limits;
- Unsafe and unlawful overtaking across barrier lines;

Figure 3.4 displays a more detailed list of human factors, causing road accidents.

Figure 3.4: Human Factors contributing to Crashes

b) Vehicle factors
Due to damage to vehicles before accidents, it is not always possible to accurately detect vehicle factors. However, history has revealed that the main vehicle factors contribute to road accidents:

- Tyre burst prior to crash relating to damaged tyres or debris on the road;
- Faulty brakes contributing to head-on crashes, resulting in fatalities;
- Faulty steering due to poor maintenance and leading to unroadworthy vehicles and accidents; and
- Faulty lights.

c) Road and Environment Factors
Road surfaces, the degree of potholes and poorly repaired and maintained roads throughout the SADC region cause damage to vehicles and result in road accidents and deaths.

The following road and environmental factors impact negatively on road safety:

- Sharp bend in road(s), coupled with too high speed limits or poor or inadequate signage indicating motorists of such bends;
- Poor condition of the road surface, noted in potholes and bumpy driving conditions; and
- Poor visibility relating to driving too fast under adverse conditions and/or inadequate advance warning of such conditions.

3.3 Road Safety Challenges in South Africa
Further to the main causes of road accidents in South Africa, the safety of roads in South Africa and the SADC region are further compromised by the following factors:

- Overloading;
- Limited information sharing amongst law enforcement officers;
- Multiplicity of law enforcement agencies;
- Cell phone usage while driving;
- Stones and other large obstructions placed on roads, or thrown from cross-over bridges causing road crashes and leaving the victims defenceless to robbery;
- Fraudulent documentation; and
- Regulations.
3.3.1 Overloading

South Africa has been battling to control overloading for decades, despite efforts aimed at more effective law enforcement. Overloading causes accelerated road deterioration, which increases the likelihood of road accidents and raises logistics costs in the country. Due to a culture of non-compliance in South Africa, overloading is a common offence for prosecution in South African courts.

While South Africa has good road infrastructure by continental and even international standards, a high number of highways and freeways and high geometric standards, a lot of deterioration, particularly with regards to provincial roads and municipal/metropolitan road networks has become evident in recent years.

In an attempt to curb the overloading of vehicles, the Department of Transport, in conjunction with provincial traffic authorities, the South African National Roads Agency Limited (SANRAL) and the Council for Scientific and Industrial research (CSIR) has drafted the National Overload Strategy to address the problem of overloaded vehicles. This strategy covers the issues of self-regulation by the freight industry, funding, training and operational issues and a review of the 5% tolerance on the mass limit that is allowed for in the Road Traffic Act.

Overloading is not experienced in South Africa alone. On the contrary, the control of vehicle overloading is a subject that has received increasing attention within the Eastern and Southern Regions of Africa over the last decade, owing to its notable impact on road conditions, road safety and road transportation costs. In an effort to take the necessary corrective actions, a number of partnerships have been established, and initiatives undertaken to implement appropriate overloading control strategies within the Eastern and Southern African (ESA) countries.

To date agreement has been reached on the harmonisation of a number of important aspects in overload control in the ESA countries. Of specific importance is agreement on:

a) Legislation and Regulations

- Adoption by all REC's of the SADC MoU and Model Legislative Provisions on Vehicle loading;
- Common vehicle and axle/axle unit loads;
- Introduction of a bridge formula for the protection of bridges;
- Common weighing tolerances;
- Banning of quadrem axle units;
- Allowance of lift axles;
- Weighbridge verification intervals;
➤ Auditing of weighbridges;
➤ Decriminalisation of overloading offences and introduction of administratively administered fees;
➤ Level of fees to be based on recovery of road damage; and
➤ Development and facilitation of the implementation of a data management system.

b) **Weighbridge Infrastructure and Equipment**
➤ Development of a strategic network plan for the location of overload control stations on major transport corridors; and
➤ Selection of appropriate weighbridge types, based on traffic volumes.

c) **Enforcement and Weighbridge Operations**
➤ Private sector participation in the operation and maintenance of weighbridges;
➤ Introduction of a cross-border overload control system at all border posts along regional corridors; and
➤ Adoption of a policy to promote the implementation of a self-regulation and accreditation system of overload control.

d) **Institutional Arrangements**
➤ REC support to sub-regional organisations in their management and implementation of overload control programmes; and
➤ Establishment of dedicated overload control enforcement units by Member States.

e) **Human Resources**
➤ REC pursuit of the establishment of a Regional Training Centre for overload control;
➤ Adoption of a common training syllabus;
➤ Adequate training and accreditation of overload control personnel; and
➤ Design and implementation of anti-corruption programmes.

f) **Public Awareness**
➤ RECs and Member States to engender awareness of the importance of overload control by appropriate means, e.g. leaflets, information signs as well as community and national radio stations and websites.
To implement and enforce the above agreements, joint planning, implementation and coordination is still needed at both regional and national level. Whilst the EAC is in the process of enacting the enabling regional legislation for the implementation of the above, member states that belong to COMESA and SADC still have to enact national legislation in order to domesticate regional agreements.

3.3.2 Limited information sharing amongst law enforcement officers

Limited information sharing takes place between law enforcement agencies in South Africa. At the same token, the cross-border exchange of road safety and road traffic related transgressions (e.g. information on vehicle registration/ownership, traffic fines) between SADC member states is non-existent.

The seemingly simple act of information sharing amongst law enforcement agencies in the region is compromised by “invisible barriers” such as a lack of trust between role-players, security, politics, regulations, and management decisions.

As a result, it is often impossible to trace the owners or employers of foreign drivers and, even when they can be traced; there is no legal process by which they can be forced to pay penalties while they are in their country of origin.

A critical success factor towards road safety in the SADC region lies in the establishment of a system for the cross-border exchange of all road safety / traffic related information. Information can be exchanged in a number of ways; i.e.:

- On-line exchange of information. This option will require substantial investment in ICT systems by member states and may not materialise over the short term due to funding constraints at member state level; and
- Convening of communication workshops at national and regional level to provide a platform for the exchange of information.

3.3.3 Multiplicity of law enforcement agencies

The findings of a 2012 report, compiled by Imperial Logistics, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and Stellenbosch University, cite fragmented law enforcement agencies as a compounding factor to South Africa’s poor road safety record (Business Day Live. June 2013).

Current law enforcement practices are not effective in maintaining law and order on South African roads. In South Africa roadside inspections are conducted by various role-players, e.g. the South African Police Services (SAPS), Provincial Road Transport Departments, the Cross-Border Road Transport Agency (C-BRTA) and the Road Traffic Management Corporation (RTMC), to name a few. Since each public sector department has its own mandate and set of rules, the way in which inspections are conducted vary, pointing to a lack of harmonised road transport law enforcement in the country.
Each of the above role-players conducts individual inspections at several points along South Africa’s national and provincial road networks. Intermittent road checks cause interruptions (delays) in traffic flows and increase the cost of moving traffic between various locations. Furthermore, the existence of various road checkpoints increases the likelihood of corrupt activities to take place.

3.3.4 Insufficient resources to conduct law enforcement activities

Due to financial constraints, most law enforcement agencies in South Africa operate below human capacity requirements. The case is no different for the C-BRTA. In order to perform its mandate effectively, C-BRTA inspectors have to be deployed along all strategic roads, leading to border posts to perform cross-border inspections.

However, due to human resources constraints within the Road Transport Inspectorate (Rti) division of the Agency, inspectors are positioned along certain South African routes only. In most cases inspections are conducted on the shoulder of the roads, posing a safety threat to road users.

The Eastern Province for example, does not have a C-BRTA office and therefore no permanent C-BRTA visibility along roads that traverse the Eastern Cape. During peak periods, inspectors from KZN are deployed to Sanie pass and Qacha’s Nek to perform cross border road transport inspections.

Table 3.3 outlines the current positioning of C-BRTA inspectors within South Africa.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>C-BRTA Office</th>
<th>Number of Inspectors</th>
<th>C-BRTA Inspection Points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Western Cape</strong></td>
<td>Bellville</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Town/City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Springbok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Bellville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Cape Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Harbour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Cape Town</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>✓ Saldanha</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Border Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Vioolsdrift</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Eastern Cape</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Border Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Sanie pass</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Qacha’s Nek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>✓ Springbok</td>
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<td>✓ Alexander Bay</td>
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<td>✓ Kuruman</td>
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<td>Border Post</td>
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<td>✓ Nakop</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>✓ Vioolsdrift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Free State</strong></td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Strategic Route</td>
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<td>✓ N1</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>✓ Johannesburg central</td>
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<tr>
<td>Province</td>
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<td>Number of Inspectors</td>
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<td>---------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Zeerust</td>
<td>13</td>
<td><strong>Strategic Route</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ N4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Town</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Swartruggens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Border Post</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Skilpadhek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Ramatlabama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>Mokopane</td>
<td>11</td>
<td><strong>Border Post</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Stockpoort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Groblersbridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Zanziba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Giriondo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Phalaborwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Musina</td>
<td>17</td>
<td><strong>Town</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Musina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Musina Traffic Control Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Border Post</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Beitbridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Punda Maria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Stockpoort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Groblersbridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Pafuri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Giriyondo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>Nelspruit</td>
<td>16</td>
<td><strong>Strategic Route</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Border Post</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Lebombo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Oshoek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Mananga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Jeepies Drift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Komatipoort</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu Natal</td>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>12</td>
<td><strong>Strategic Route</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>C-BRTA Office</td>
<td>Number of Inspectors</td>
<td>C-BRTA Inspection Points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City/Town</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✔ Durban</td>
<td>✔ Pietermaritzburg</td>
<td>✔ Pinetown</td>
<td>✔ Mooiriver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✔ Richardsbay</td>
<td>✔ Durban</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Post</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✔ Sanipas</td>
<td>✔ Golela</td>
<td>✔ Mahamba</td>
<td>✔ Kosie Bay</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 119

Source: Table specifically designed for study

From the information displayed in Table 3.3 it is clear that a limited number of inspectors (119 in total) are strategically deployed at various national and provincial roads, towns, harbours and inland border posts across South Africa.

Although inspectors are deployed at prioritised border posts, they do not have a permanent physical presence at such borders. Instead, inspectors travel on a daily basis between regional offices and regional deployment points. This practice results in high transportation costs for the C-BRTA.

3.3.5 Use of own vehicles by C-BRTA law enforcement officers

C-BRTA law enforcement officials use their own cars to carry out their work. A problem associated with this practice is that it inhibits opportunities for increased visibility in regard to would-be offenders, and compromises the branding of the Agency. Furthermore, the Agency’s inspectors are often subjected to bribes by illegal cross border operators who are aware that inspectors are not visible to the public eye.

Another limitation associated with the use of private vehicles for official tasks is that it may result in the submission of false travel claims which do not reflect the actual kilometres travelled. As a result, public officials may pocket government money to which they are not entitled.
3.3.6 Fraudulent Information

The Regulatory Division of the C-BRTA often receives fraudulent supporting documentation (e.g. SARS clearance certificates and close corporation registration documents) that should accompany permit applications. In such cases permit applications are declined.

It should be noted that no provision is made for the above offence (false supporting documents) under section 40 of the Cross Border Road Transport Act, No. 4 of 1998. This limitation points to the need to amend the Cross-Border Road Transport Act regulations to incorporate statutory offence(s). In doing so, it will be possible to action further against cross-border road transport operators who submit fraudulent documents to the Regulatory Committee.

In addition provision has to be made for the issuance of a notice, by a road transport inspector to an operator, to discontinue cross-border road transport in instances of a section 40 offence.

3.3.7 Regulations

The RTI of the C-BRTA is responsible for monitoring compliance by cross-border road transport operators with all cross-border road transport legislation. Law enforcement activities are conducted through targeted roadside inspections. The Inspectorate uses a schedule of offences that gets approved on an annual basis by the respective magisterial districts.

A problem associated with this practice is that it inadvertently leads to differentiated fine lists. For example, the maximum fine imposed on an operator conducting services without a cross border road transport permit during 2014/15 in Musina was R2 500 while the fine for the same offence in Nelspruit was R2 000. This clearly points to a lack of harmonisation and fragmentation within the law enforcement environment.

The above impediment is exacerbated by the fact that the fines attached to most cross-border offences are cheaper than the cost of obtaining a permit. For example, the fine for operating without a cross-border permit in Musina amounts to R2 500, while the cost of obtaining a one year permit for the following classes of vehicles are:

- R1 940 for vehicles carrying less than 35 passengers;
- R2 160 for vehicles carrying more than 35 passengers;
- R4 860 for Class 1 (<20 000kg) goods vehicles;
- R6 480 for Class 2 (>20 000kg) goods vehicles; and
- R20 000 for cabotage.
3.4 Road Safety Initiatives / Strategies

Given South Africa’s poor road safety record, a number of road strategies and initiatives have been developed over the past two decades in an attempt to improve road safety in the country.

a) Arrive Alive Campaign

The Department of Transport launched the Arrive Alive road safety campaign in 1997 to reduce bloodshed on South African roads in 1997. Although this initiative is on-going, it is intensified during the December festive and Easter holidays. The Department of Roads and Transport in each of the nine provinces, together with local authorities is responsible for the deployment of traffic officers to enforce traffic laws on all national, provincial and local roads.

Since its inception in 1997, the Arrive Alive Campaign's central theme has been *Speed kills and don’t drink and drive*, used interchangeably. In light of South Africa’s safety record, it seems as if these two themes have fallen on deaf ears of motorists and pedestrians alike, as road carnage on South African roads remains alarmingly high.

In order to curb road carnage, the Minister of Transport has announced the establishment of a high-powered panel of experts, consisting of academics, engineers, business people, unionists and community activists, in June 2015 to advise the Road Traffic Management Corporation (RTMC) on initiatives to reduce the number of people dying on South African roads. This panel, known as the Road Safety Council, is to meet quarterly to provide inputs into the strategic direction, oversight and critical assessment of proposed road safety initiatives and campaigns.

In response to the number of road deaths over the 2015 festive season, the Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Transport, Ms Dikeledi Magadzi commented that the Arrive Alive campaign is not sufficient and urged members of the Committee to undertake a review of all existing road safety programmes in South Africa with a view to make recommendations where gaps exist. (http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=8542).

This notion is supported by other role-players (e.g. political parties & media) who favour a more revolutionary and holistic approach to keep citizens alive on the country’s national, provincial and municipal roads.

b) Launch of the C-BRTA Cross-Alive Campaign

In 2013 the Honourable Minister of Transport launched the C-BRTA Cross Alive Road Safety programme in Musina, Limpopo. The objective of this programme is to ensure the Agency’s continued participation in road safety initiatives at national and regional level.
The Cross Alive campaign seeks to outline the C-BRTA’s programme of action within the transport community and the realisation of its socio-economic responsibility. The launch in Musina aimed to support the Musina municipality towards improving road safety challenges, acknowledging the fact that Musina is located in close proximity to the Beitbridge border post and therefore accommodates high volumes of cross-border road transport movements.

During 2014 the Cross-Alive initiative was extended to Ficksburg, a small town in the Free State province, which provides entry to the Kingdom of Lesotho. The campaign took the form of multi stakeholder road safety activation, which included inspections on vehicles, travelling along the Free State border routes to the Ficksburg, Maseru, Fouriesburg and Wepener Border Posts.

During the launch of the campaign, the Minister of Transport, Honourable Dipuo Peters, interacted with the local community. Apart from sensitising the audience of the importance of traveling in roadworthy vehicles, wearing seatbelts and adhering to the rules of the road at all times, she stressed that fact that ultimate success depends on the ability of role-players to take hands in fighting road crashes and fatalities in South Africa.

As part of October month celebrations, the Minister of Transport, accompanied by representatives of the C-BRTA, conducted a Cross-Alive Road safety campaign in Komatipoort, Mpumalanga in October 2014. The objective of this campaign was to ensure that cross border road transport operators and motorists traveling on regional road transport corridors reach their destinations safely.

During this event, the C-BRTA conducted joint law enforcement operations with other law enforcement agencies. In adhering to this multi-disciplinary approach, more motorists were reached. Apart from educating motorists and passengers on the importance of adhering to the rules of the road, roadside inspections resulted in an increase in the number of non-complying motorists and un-roadworthy vehicles, which were removed from the road.

As part of the 2015 October month celebrations, representatives from the C-BRTA extended the Cross-Alive campaign to Zeerust, in the North West province. Joint law enforcement inspections were conducted with other law enforcers to monitor road safety and operator compliance. A total of 194 cross border vehicles were examined and two prosecutions were issued by the C-BRTA for non-compliance.

c) Road Safety Media Campaigns

A road safety publicity campaign is part of a set of activities that aim to promote safe road use. Campaigns normally intend to:

- Raise awareness of an issue or to inform (for example about new laws);
➢ Change attitudes (for example to improve public acceptance of road safety measures); and

➢ Change behaviour, as part of a package of measures (for example engineering and/or enforcement related to speeding).

Mass media advertising is often the most visible component of a campaign, however to be effective in changing behaviour, this type of advertising must be combined with government and/or community support, which must be visible when involving law enforcement.

The Arrive Alive Initiative is an example of a road safety initiative, supported by government, promoted in the media and enforced by law enforcement officials. Arrive Alive banners and cars that have been involved in accidents with accompanying slogans all attend to make the public aware of the importance of road safety in South Africa.

d) Imperial Road Safety Campaign

The Imperial Road Safety campaign was re-launched for the fourth consecutive year in December 2015, in partnership with Bakwena N1 N4 toll road and N3 Toll concession on the N1, N4 and N3 national roads. The purpose of this campaign is to raise awareness and supporting key initiatives that encourage road safety in South Africa.

As part of this initiative, Imperial Road Safety and Imperial’s car rental division, through Europcar, has handed four vehicles to Bakwena, as well as 15 patrol and emergency medical rescue service vehicle to N3TC, to be used between 10 December 2015 and 05 January 2016. This vehicle sponsorship aims to increase and boost route surveillance, patrol support and post-crash care during South Africa’s busiest season(s).

The Imperial road safety campaign has revealed that visible policing on South African roads influences consumers to more cautious and to ensure they practice safer road usage.

e) SADC Road Safety Technical Committee

SADC supports the United Nations Resolution regarding “A Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011-2020 through the harmonisation of member state initiatives in the region. The Decade of Action Road Safety strategy is based on five key pillars, e.g.:

➢ Safer roads;

➢ Safer vehicles;

➢ Safer road users;
- Improved trauma care; and
- Rehabilitation services.

The SADC Road Safety Technical Committee nominated South Africa to host the launch of the regional version of the UN Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011-2020 under the theme “Together we can save millions of lives”. During this event, the following actions transpired:

- The Minister of Transport in South Africa was declared as the regional road safety champion for two years; and
- The seat belt wearing and pedestrian safety strategy was launched.

In response to the above, a number of member states launched road safety initiatives to improve road safety at member state level. Zimbabwe established a Road Safety Council, operating at arm’s length from the Ministry of Transport to attend to road safety concerns, while Zambia performs road safety functions through the Road Traffic and Safety Agency, a prototype of the C-BRTA in South Africa.

In Namibia, a National Road Safety Council operates at arm’s length from government. This body is mandated to collate and analyse road crash data in the country with a view to identify underpinning causes and suggest remedial interventions to improve road safety in Namibia. Namibia also allocates a national budget towards the execution of road safety programmes.

Despite the existence of dedicated road safety agencies and the launch of various road safety initiatives at regional and member state level, the SADC road network has a poor safety record, measured by world standards. This state of affairs calls for urgent intervention by governments in the respective member states.

3.5 Operator Compliance and Law Enforcement

3.5.1 Background
Previous sections of this chapter alluded to the fact that a myriad of factors, i.e. high level of non-compliance by road transport users and a lack of law enforcement, contribute to South Africa’s poor road safety record.

Although various road traffic offence surveys were conducted in South Africa over the years, the latest published traffic offence survey was conducted in 2010. According to information sources at hand, a traffic offence survey was initiated in 2015. The finding(s) of this survey, is not yet known. The absence of reliable traffic offence data makes it difficult to obtain an accurate picture of the general level of lawlessness on South African roads. Reliable and recent data is required to measure progress and success.
The 2013 WHO Global Status Report on Road Safety report lists comparative figures on the level or quality of traffic law enforcement for a number of countries. A total of 100 countries were randomly selected from this report for comparison with regard to law enforcement. Figure 3.5 displays the findings of a selected number of countries, including South Africa.

**Figure 3.5: Comparative Quality of Law Enforcement**

The data displayed in Figure 3.5 clearly indicates that South Africa and India obtained the second lowest score in terms of the quality of law enforcement inspections. Both countries obtained a rating of approximately 2.6 out of a maximum score of 10. Uganda obtained the lowest rating (1.7). This state of affairs calls for urgent intervention by South African authorities to improve the quality of law enforcement checks along South African roads.

The relation between fatality rates and the level or quality of law enforcement is reflected in figure 3.6 below.
Based on the WHO Global Status Report, the data in the graph above indicates a strong correlation between the quality of enforcement rating and the fatality rate. The lower the quality of enforcement, the higher the fatality rate. This emphasises the need to drastically improve the level and quality of traffic law enforcement in South Africa, indicated by the red “dot” in the lower right corner.

In response to the above impediment(s), the Road Traffic Management Corporation (RTMC) has recently embarked on a process of establishing a national database into which all traffic infringements will be documented by metro’s, provincial and local governments and the national traffic police. The outputs of this system will compliment outsourced traffic offence surveys. Furthermore it will provide an incessant traffic offence survey on normal policing activities.

3.5.2 Compliance by Cross-Border Road Transport Operators

As a transport regulator, the C-BRTA is mandated to facilitate the unimpeded flow of cross-border road transport movements; inter alia, through regulating access to cross-border markets through the issuing of permits, as well as through conducting law enforcement activities along strategic road transport corridors to ensure that cross-border road transport operators comply with applicable legislation. The importance of these 2 functions is illustrated by the fact that they make up all the total income for the Agency.
Table 3.4 – 3.7 below illustrate the number of cross-border permits issued to different categories of cross border road transport vehicles for the 2013/14 and 2014/15 financial years.

**Table 3.4: Goods Permit Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2014/15</th>
<th>2013/14</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>7 875</td>
<td>8 180</td>
<td>(3.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>3 536</td>
<td>3 328</td>
<td>6.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>3 896</td>
<td>4 026</td>
<td>(3.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>1 809</td>
<td>1 814</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>11 299</td>
<td>10 625</td>
<td>6.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>6 648</td>
<td>6 234</td>
<td>6.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>5 355</td>
<td>5 281</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>12 391</td>
<td>13 271</td>
<td>6.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>9 599</td>
<td>10 666</td>
<td>(10.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabotage</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>(35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>62 647</td>
<td>63 935</td>
<td>(2.01)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Cross Border Road Transport Agency. Annual Report 2014/15*

From the information displayed in Table 3.4, and discussions with senior employees in the Regulatory division, the following findings are deduced:

- The number of goods permits issued to Angolan operators increased by 200%. This increase should be seen within context since goods permits were issued to Angolan operators for the first time in FY 2014/15;
- The decline in cabotage permits is attributable to stricter adherence to the requirements associated with the issuing of such permits;
- Since the goods permit increased in 2011, there was a movement towards the application for long-term (one to five year) permits; and
Overall, there was a year-on-year decrease of 2.01% in the number of permits issued to road freight transport operators between FY’s 2013/14 and 2014/15.

Table 3.5: Taxi Passenger Permit Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2014/15</th>
<th>2013/14</th>
<th>% Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>(50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>2 093</td>
<td>2718</td>
<td>(23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>4 907</td>
<td>4 390</td>
<td>11.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>(47.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>27.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>3 521</td>
<td>2 882</td>
<td>22.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabotage</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11 633</td>
<td>11 062</td>
<td>5.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cross Border Road Transport Agency. Annual Report 2014/15

Permits issues to taxi operators increased by approximately 5% during the period under review. On the other hand the number of permits issued to bus operators reflected a sharp decline of 19.67% over the same period.
Table 3.6 Bus Passenger Permit Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2014/15</th>
<th>2013/14</th>
<th>% Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>(76.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>(18.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>(23.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>(41.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>(18.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>(2.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>26.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1 047</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>19.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabotage</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2 234</td>
<td>2 781</td>
<td>(19.67)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cross Border Road Transport Agency. Annual Report 2014/15

Table 3.7 Tourist Permit Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2014/15</th>
<th>2013/14</th>
<th>% Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>2 341</td>
<td>2 213</td>
<td>5.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabotage</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>(12.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2 370</td>
<td>2 246</td>
<td>5.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cross Border Road Transport Agency. Annual Report 2014/15

The number of permits issued over the period over review declined by approximately 1.42% over the period under review from 80 024 permits in FY 2013/14 to 78 884 permits in FY 2014/15. This translates to a decrease of 1 140 permits.

Considering the above permit statistics, and acknowledging the fact that the number
of permits issued decreased for most categories of cross-border vehicles over the period under review, Table 3.8 illustrates the extent of operator compliance over the same period.

**Table 3.8 Operator Compliance as measured by the RTI Division**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance Indicator</th>
<th>2014/15</th>
<th>2013/14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Inspections p.a.</td>
<td>220 273</td>
<td>211 798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Prosecutions</td>
<td>26 964</td>
<td>29 411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of Operator Compliance p.a.</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of penalty income generated</td>
<td>R32,989,602</td>
<td>R35,052 800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: Cross Border Road Transport Agency. Annual Report 2013/14, supplemented by C-BRTA profiling data

From the information displayed in Table 3.7 the following findings are deduced:

- The number of inspections reflected an 4% increase from 211 798 in FY 2013/14 to 220 273 in FY 2014/15;
- The number of prosecutions issued decreased by 8.3% from 29 411 in 2013/14 to 26 964 in 2014/15;
- Operator compliance increased by 7% over the period under review; and
- Although the number of inspections increased, fewer penalties were issued over the period under review. As a result, operator compliance increased, and penalty income decreased.

The internal data systems of the C-BRTA enables the Agency to determine the number of permits issued per vehicle category and route, as well as the rate of compliance by cross border road transport operators. There is however, no systematic collection of detailed data on cross border traffic accidents and their severity which is useful in determining the main causes of cross border road related accidents. Such information could be useful towards continuous improvement of the regulatory environment and instruments.

Furthermore, the C-BRTA customer registration software application is limited to the updating of existing, or the registration of new cross-border road transport permits. The Cross Border Road Transport System (C-BRTS) does not have any integration capabilities with other national data systems. Therefore the capturing of basic operator information is duplicated by hand and not obtained from other data sources.
such as the e-NATIS vehicle registration data base.

The above impediment emphasises the need for intervention. The C-BRTA, as a prominent role-player in the cross-border road transport environment, will only be able to propose meaningful solutions to South Africa’s poor road safety record if updated and reliable statistics on road accidents and road traffic transgressions are shared between all role-players.

Against this background, the need to fast-track internal reforms, notably the implementation of Business Intelligent Systems (BIS) becomes apparent. The implementation of BIS will enable the C-BRTA to capture, process and release real-time corridor information to all role-players, thereby allowing decision-makers to measure progress and enact reforms.

3.5 Conclusion

On the international front, South Africa is regularly singled out as one of the worst performing countries in the world as far as road safety is concerned. Estimates, released by the International Transport Forum (ITF) reveals that the country’s road accident costs exceed R300 billion per annum.

History reveals that accidents are caused by a number of factors. While the state of vehicles and roads act as contributing factors to accidents, the majority of accidents in South Africa are caused by poor driver behaviour, which manifest in actions such as speeding, driving under the influence of alcohol and jay walking.

This state of affairs calls for urgent intervention - enacting laws that address the risk factors of speed control, drunk-driving, seat belt use and child restraint, coupled with efficient law enforcement are items that should receive top priority by government. Various initiatives have been undertaken by the public sector and industry players (Imperial) over the years to educate road transport users on the importance of adhering to the rules of the road. These programmes all aim to change human behaviour. Individuals are in the best position to affect improvements, since change starts with them.

The success of road safety reforms depends on the availability of reliable road traffic information. Unfortunately data on vehicle accidents, fatalities and the location of accidents is not readily available in South Africa. In the absence of data, it becomes difficult to measure progress and gaps. The success of intervention measures, aimed at promoting road safety and operator compliance, depends on the accuracy of real-time information.
4. REPORT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Previous chapters of this report revealed that the efficiency of land borders is undermined by various infrastructure and operational impediments. The story is no different as far as road safety is concerned. South Africa faces one of the worst road safety records in the world. The high road fatality rate can be attributed to various factors; e.g. poor driver behaviour, unsafe vehicles and environmental factors.

This chapter presents a number of report findings and recommendations. Once buy-in has been obtained into proposed recommendations, it will enable decision-making authorities within their respective jurisdictions to introduce interventions, aimed at addressing border post and road safety and operator compliance constraints in South Africa.

4.1 Findings and Recommendations to Border Post Constraints

Border posts in the SADC region currently act as trade security, instead of trade facilitation points. The existence of various hard and soft infrastructure constraints, coupled with operational inefficiencies has created a situation in which border posts are regarded as the greatest obstacle to intra-regional trade and transport flows.

Report findings and recommendations are presented in tabular format here-under. These tables incorporate action plans, thereby indicating how infrastructure and operational constraints can be addressed. The name (s) of the stakeholders, responsible for driving the proposed reforms is also provided.
### 4.1.1 Infrastructure Constraints at Border Posts

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<tr>
<td><strong>Hard Infrastructure</strong></td>
<td>Border posts are marred with inadequate <strong>hard</strong> infrastructure, e.g.:&lt;br&gt;- Inadequate approach roads to border posts;&lt;br&gt;- Insufficient parking within border precinct;&lt;br&gt;- Lack of traffic separation;&lt;br&gt;- Insufficient spacing for joint inspections;&lt;br&gt;- Insufficient or no storage space for confiscated goods.</td>
<td>In order to address hard and soft infrastructure constraints at border posts, the timeous implementation of border post projects, prioritised in the SADC RIDMP, is of paramount importance. Infrastructure upgrades at border posts will incorporate both hard and soft infrastructure dimensions, although more emphasis and funds will be directed towards hard infrastructure upgrades. Infrastructure upgrades will incorporate:&lt;br&gt;- Expansion of physical infrastructure such as parking areas, buildings, access roads and inspection areas;&lt;br&gt;- Introduction of information sharing capacity (ICT) to facilitate fast processing requirements and process flows;&lt;br&gt;- Introduction of the most appropriate infrastructure to enable smooth and co-ordinated border process sequences, allowing for example joint back to back immigration operations or customs inspections by both bordering countries.</td>
<td>➢ Engagements between relevant role-players (border stakeholders, freight forwarding agents, private sector) should be intensified to obtain buy-in and cooperation into prioritised regional border post reforms;&lt;br&gt;➢ Given the capital intensive nature of capital expenditure programmes, MS’s should create partnerships with the private sector through PPPs to enable the timeous execution of prioritised border post projects;&lt;br&gt;➢ The operationalization of the SADC Project Preparation Development Facility (PPDF) should be fast tracked to accelerate project preparation, which in turn will attract project funding;&lt;br&gt;➢ The feasibility of establishing a supra national authority at regional level to enforce the implementation of regional decisions (infrastructure projects) should be investigated.</td>
<td>C-BRTA to engage the following stakeholders:&lt;br&gt;- Border post stakeholders at national and member state level;&lt;br&gt;- Department of Public Works;&lt;br&gt;- Private sector;&lt;br&gt;- Donor Agencies;&lt;br&gt;- Local Communities.</td>
<td>➢ Between June 2016 and September 2016.</td>
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<td><strong>Soft Infrastructure</strong></td>
<td>The performance of land borders is also undermined by the following <strong>soft</strong> infrastructure constraints:&lt;br&gt;- Lack of adequate efficient border management and governance systems;&lt;br&gt;- Lack of cooperation and communication among stakeholders;&lt;br&gt;- Duplication of operational activities;&lt;br&gt;- Lack of systems process integrations;&lt;br&gt;- Red tape and corruption.</td>
<td>All border post projects are aimed at establishing OSBPs in the long run. Since success of OSBPs is dependent upon cooperation amongst border agencies on both sides of the border and their respective governments, it is apparent that political will and commitment should be obtained from all role-players to accrue the benefits of OSBPs.</td>
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### 4.1.2 Operational Constraints at Border Posts

#### a) Ranking Facilities

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| Ranking Facilities  | The existence of ranking facilities at the border entrance of various commercial border posts in the SADC region disrupts traffic movements, increase the likelihood of accidents and corruption and exacerbate congestion at inland borders. At the same time it compromises border security and integrity. | The establishment of illegal public ranking facilities in close proximity to border entrances is prohibited in terms of South African law. Against this background, the following actions are proposed:  
  - Law enforcement visibility at ports of entry should be increased to curb illegal practices.  
  - Heavy fines should be imposed on operators who contravene the stipulations of applicable legislation (e.g. NLTA No. 5 of 2009).  
  - If vacant land is available, priority should be given to the relocation of ranking facilities. However, this will only materialise after extensive stakeholder consultations, and once permission has been obtained from the owner(s) of the land and funds been secured to enable the relocation of ranking facilities.  
  - More law enforcement officials should be deployed at land borders to prohibit the use of illegal ranking facilities. This includes the permanent positioning of C-BRTA law enforcement officials at inland borders;  
  - A variety of sanctions should be imposed on offenders, for example heavy fines and compounding of vehicles;  
  - An inclusive approach should be adopted when decisions are made regarding the movement of informal ranking facilities. All stakeholders – public and private sector, land owners, local communities – should form part of the consultation process.                                                                                           | C-BRTA to engage the following stakeholders:  
  - Law enforcement officials positioned at land borders;  
  - Taxi associations and operators;  
  - BCOC;  
  - Private sector;  
  - Owners of land adjacent to border posts; and  
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| **Operating Hours** | Only a few border posts in the SADC region operate 24 hour per day, all year round. Even where border posts are open 24 hours per day (e.g. Beitbridge), the clearing of goods only occurs until 22:00 at night. If all border stakeholders do not operate in concert, according to the same timetable, then the overall impact of 24 hour border posts - which seeks to improve the uninterrupted flow of traffic through border posts - is negated. | Border posts will only act as trade facilitation points once they operate 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, 365 days of the year. The SADC RIDMP prioritises the establishment of 18 OSBP's to enhance trade and traffic facilitation by reducing the number of stops incurred in a cross border trade transaction. OSBP's entails combining the activities of both countries' border role-players at a single location with simplified procedures and joint processing and inspections. The seamless flow of traffic through inland border posts will only materialise once all border post stakeholders conduct their activities throughout the day to prevent congestion within the border precinct; thereby enabling same day traffic for the majority of freight vehicles. In order to move towards the 24 hour functioning of commercial border posts, the following actions are proposed:  
> Policy and legal frameworks should be put in place at member state level that support OSBP's;  
> Member states should devise new resource plans to allow the deployment of additional resources at border posts according to a 24 hour schedule;  
> Additional funds should be secured at member state level to meet revised human resource requirements;  
> Training plans should also be crafted and imposed upon all border stakeholders to allow for improved border processes (e.g. joint inspections). | ➢ Legal frameworks at member state level should be amended to support the establishment and functioning of OSBP's;  
➢ Bilateral discussions between member states who share borders should result in the development of revised human resource plans that address human resource needs of OSBP's;  
➢ Additional funds should be secured at member state level to address human resources requirements.  

Once the above actions have been conducted at member state level, engagements should be extended to regional counterparts to enable:  
➢ The signing of MoU's that stipulate how operational activities (e.g. joint operations) should be conducted once prioritised border posts have been transformed into OSBP's. | C-BRTA to engage the following stakeholders:  
➢ Relevant Ministries and Departments (dealing with regional integration matters) at member states level; and  
➢ Border stakeholders at national and member state level. | On-going. |
c) Power Shortages at Border Posts

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| Power Shortages   | Power shortages at commercial border posts are a regular occurrence. Currently, all customs clearance entries are done electronically. This means, that when the power supply is cut off, no entries can be processed and the entire process grinds to a halt. SADC has experienced power shortages since 2007 as the generation surplus capacity has diminished while demand has grown. This situation has prompted many Member States, including South Africa, to resort to various coping mechanisms that include load shedding. | In order to improve the operational efficiency of border posts, 18 inland borders in the SADC will be transformed into OSBPs in the foreseeable future. The efficient functioning of OSBP’s depends on uninterrupted power supply to allow for the electronic exchange of border related information amongst border stakeholders. In the absence of power, border posts will not be able to function as fully-fledged OSBPs. The following actions are proposed to improve power supply at commercial border posts in the SADC:  
- Since bilateral contracts account for more than 90% of all energy traded in the region, member states should accurately forecast energy demand prior to signing energy contracts to ensure that adequate power is negotiated and supplied at member state level;  
- Although a number of member states have already connected their power grids, negotiations with non-participating states should continue to convince them to follow suit;  
- At regional level, long-term solutions (e.g. building of new power stations, exploring alternative sources of energy) should be sought to improve the regional power supply. Given the capital intensive nature of this reform initiative, alternative sources of funding (e.g. PPP) should be sought to enable execution;  
- While long-term solutions are sought to the region’s energy constraints, all commercial border posts should be equipped with generators, capable of producing sufficient power, to enable the normal functioning of such borders. Furthermore, operational budgets should cover the running costs (e.g. fuel) associated with the use of generators. | Member States should intensity their engagements in order to:  
- Promote power pooling and trade in electricity, as described in the Southern African Power Pool Intergovernmental Memorandum of Understanding;  
- Promote integrated resource planning as it pertains to electricity, taking advantage of economies of scale to optimise investment and benefits;  
- Coordinate the implementation of a Regional Electricity Master Plan that outlines alternative power supply solutions;  
- Promote regional standards, rules, and procedures that relate to electricity generation, transmission, and distribution;  
- Develop and use electricity in an environmentally sound manner, with projects following basic environmental standards;  
- Given the capital-intensive nature of long-term energy generation solutions, the private sector should be involved from the outset, not only in financing new programmes, but also to provide technical expertise throughout project implementation; and  
- In the interim, member states include the running cost of generators in their operating budgets to ensure normal border post activities can be carried out during power outages. | C-BRTA to engage the following stakeholders through the DoT:  
- Ministers responsible for Energy at member state level;  
- Regional committees (SADC Secretariat); and  
### Absence of Cargo Scanners

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| Cargo Scanners      | Due to funding constraints, cargo scanners are either non-existent, or in short supply at inland border posts. In the absence of cargo scanning technology, consignments are inspected physically, resulting in time delays and increases in crime/smuggling. | The use of modern technologies facilitates the speedy clearance of traffic (passengers and freight) through border posts. It is therefore recommended that:  
- Adequate funds be set aside at member state level to cover the cost associated with the purchase and maintenance of modern, state-of-the-art cargo scanning technologies | Member state should engage with each other and other role-players (private sector) to ensure that they invest in technology that is compatible, and which allows the sharing of traffic-related data amongst all border stakeholders; and  
- Member states should budget adequately for the purchase of cargo scanning technology. | C-BRTA to engage the following stakeholders:  
- Relevant member states Ministries and Departments; and  
### Non-existence of Automatic Number Plate Recognition systems

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| **Automatic Number Plate Recognition** | Currently the introduction of smart technologies is at the forefront of corridor and border post developments. Although smart technologies (e.g. passport scanners) are used at most commercial border posts to detect criminals and to clear travellers with minimum inconvenience, smart technologies for freight are not readily available and used. To date, automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) technology has only been installed at a few border posts (e.g. Mamuno) in the SADC to speed up the clearance of freight vehicles. Although SARS records information on all vehicles entering and exiting South Africa, the data disseminated by SARS is not disaggregated. As a result, important cross-border traffic flow information (e.g. origin of the vehicle, type of vehicle) is not available. | Given the scarcity of real-time information on cross-border road transport flows, it is proposed that:  
- ANPR technology is installed at all commercial border posts in the SADC to accurately capture the movement of cross-border vehicles as they move through border posts. This reform poses the following advantages:  
  - Better combating of fraud and smuggling, through enhanced security;  
  - Enable the capturing of traffic flow statistics at border posts that will serve as input into the operational and strategic planning processes of corridor and border management role-players;  
  - The C-BRTA can enhance its service delivery drive through releasing processed data on traffic and freight flows to its clients (cross-border operators), thereby assisting them to better plan/schedule their transport trips;  
  - Assist law enforcement agencies to prosecute operators for offences committed in a member state, other than the one where the vehicle is registered. |  
- Member states should invest in number plate recognition systems;  
- Member state should liaise with each other prior to investing in ANPR technology to ensure that such technology is compatible and allows the electronic capturing and sharing of data amongst all relevant role-players; and  
- Member states should make adequate provision in their operational budgets for the purchase and instalment of ANPR technology. | C-BRTA to engage the following stakeholders:  
- Relevant Ministries or Departments in member states;  
- Border officials of Member states;  
- Border Committees (BCOCC); and  
### f) Training and Lack of Sufficient Staff

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| Staff Training   | Skilled resources are not adequately deployed at commercial border posts. A lack of trained resources, coupled with the silo mentality of border officials result in time delays for cross-border travellers, with an associated increase in trade and transportation costs.                                                                                   | The long-term vision is that OSBPs will operate 24 hours per day, all year round. Since border post operational hours will be extended once prioritised border posts are transformed into OSBPs, additional resources will have to be deployed at such borders. The following recommendations are proposed:  
- Member states should develop human resource plans that include training specifications for border officials, prior to enacting the legal instruments (bilateral agreements) required to operationalise OSBPs;  
- Training programmes should incorporate OSBP requirements (e.g. joint law enforcement inspections);  
- Political will need to be established at member state level between border post role-players before bringing member states together at bilateral level;  
- Further to investing in human resources, sufficient infrastructure (e.g. staff accommodation) should be provided to enable extended operational hours at OSBP's. | As a short-term measure  
- Member states who share land borders should engage in talks prior to developing human resource plans to reach agreement on critical aspects such as number of resources required and the manner in which skills will be transferred; and  
- Over the medium to long term, infrastructure at prioritised OSBP's should be expanded to provide adequate office space and shelter for border officials, according to revised human resource plans. | C-BRTA to engage the following stakeholders:  
- All border officials stationed at border posts;  
- Training institutions; and  
- Department of Public Works. | Between October 2016 and December 2016.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |

### g) Crime at Border Posts

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| Crime            | Over the years the culture of bribery has become akin to a normal business practice at SADC border posts. Government officials often hold the private sector to ransom by refusing to let trucks undergo the necessary procedures unless a bribe is paid. Transporters and agents operating at the border give in to the bribery demands out of desperation to get the trucks through the border post in the shortest possible time. | Crime and corruption at border posts can be contained through:  
- Installing modern technology (e.g. CCTV camera's) at inspection locations within the border precinct;  
- Imposing the highest penalties on border officials who are guilty of crime-related activities;  
- Encouraging cross-border operators to report incidents of crime and corruption to secure toll-free hotline(s).  
- All role-players should tie hands in fighting crime and corruption. Corridor management committees for example, can play their part in reporting cases of crime and corruption to corridor members | Member states who share land borders should engage in talks to reach agreement on the type of technology that will be installed within the border precinct and the penalties that will be imposed on border officials who engage in criminal activities; and  
- Member states should make provision in their respective operational budgets for the purchase and maintenance of modern technologies. | C-BRTA to engage the following stakeholders:  
- Border officials of Member states;  
- Border Committees (BCOCC); and  
- Corridor Committees. | Between July 2016 and December 2016.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
### 4.1.3 Road Safety

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| **Road Safety** | South Africa holds one of the worst road safety records in the world. Motor vehicle crashes are one of the leading causes of workplace fatalities and injuries in South Africa. Currently, the cost of road accidents to the South African economy exceeds R300-billion per annum. The majority of accidents in South Africa are caused by humans (82%), followed by vehicle (e.g. faulty brakes & worn tyres) and road and environmental factors (poor road surface and visibility). Although various road safety campaigns and initiatives have been launched at national and regional level to improve road safety, these interventions have not yet yielded the desired results. This calls for the adoption of a more revolutionary approach to keep South Africans alive on the country's national, provincial and municipal roads. | The following recommendations are proposed to make strides in improving road safety in South Africa:  
- Improve law enforcement visibility along South African roads. Visible policing influences consumers to be more cautious and to ensure that they practice safety road usage;  
- Since incidents involving minibus taxis are increasingly leading to fatalities, stricter regulation and policing of long-distance public transport needs to be applied;  
- During busy times of the year (Festive and Easter seasons) the placing of law enforcement officials within a 100 km radius along targeted national and provincial roads is recommended. This should be complemented by refreshment stations at regular intervals (e.g. every 200 km’s) that provide coffee, energy boosters and test kits for blood-sugar levels;  
- The consumption of alcohol and drugs greatly increases the risk of road accidents. Narcotics testing facilities should be set up, equipped with alcohol and drug screening equipment to identify drunk/intoxicated drivers and to take these drivers off the road;  
- Law enforcement officials should impose maximum penalties for serious road traffic offences (e.g. excessive speeding) for example, confiscating the driver’s vehicle. This may require a review of existing legislation to conform with good road safety practices;  
- The Department of Transport (DOT) should tie hands with the Department of Education to investigate the feasibility of introducing road safety as a non-examination subject in schools;  
- Road safety education programmes should be extended to reach the entire nation. The majority of road accidents are caused by driver behaviour. Jay-walking, drunk driving and speeding are behavioural elements that can be changed through safety education awareness programmes/initiatives;  
- In order to initiate long lasting change, improved statistical information on road crashes / fatalities should be captured, processed and circulated amongst all role-players (including the C-BRTA) to measure progress and success, and to identify where interventions are most needed;  
- Government should provide data linkages between key role-players (e.g. SARS, SAPS, RTMC, RTIA, C-BRTA) who are tasked with up-keeping road safety. This intervention will encourage cooperation between role-players and enable the online exchange of road safety data; and  
- Implementing regulatory programmes that improve road safety. | Additional resources should be assigned to law enforcement institutions to enable them to deploy extra road transport inspectors along strategic road transport corridors to conduct joint law enforcement inspections;  
- During peak periods, law enforcement officers should be strategically placed along national road networks within a radius of no more than 100 kilometres;  
- Maximum penalties should be imposed on road offenders, including confiscating drivers licences for a period of time, with the time duration linked to the seriousness of the offence;  
- Refreshment stations and narcotics testing stations should be set up at joint inspection points to allow drivers time to recuperate and to take intoxicated drivers off the road;  
- The DoT should engage in talks with the Department of Education to determine the feasibility of introducing road safety as a compulsory but non-examination subject in public schools in South Africa; and  
- Introduction of regulatory framework that enhances compliance and road safety, such as accreditation schemes in support of self-regulation initiatives. | C-BRTA to engage the following stakeholders:  
- Law enforcement agencies;  
- Other prioritised government departments (e.g. Department of Transport & Education);  
- Private sector;  
- General public. | On-going. |
### 4.1.4 Operator Compliance

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| Operator Compliance | Data on road traffic offences is not readily available in South Africa. In the absence of reliable data, it becomes difficult to accurately determine the level of operator / driver compliance on South African roads. | The following recommendations are proposed to improve the rate of driver / operator compliance amongst South African drivers:  
- Firstly, government should establish data linkages between key public sector role-players to enable the sharing of applicable data. If real-time data is available on the number of inspections, prosecutions and rate of operator compliance it will enable role-players to measure the impact of road safety and law enforcement programmes and to identify intervention measures, aimed at improving the status quo;  
- Additional law enforcement officials should be deployed along targeted national and provincial roads (especially during peak times of year) to perform roadside inspections to influence drivers to adhere to the rules of the roads;  
- Since law enforcement inspections cause delays and costs for motorists, joint law enforcement inspections (involving representatives from different law enforcement agencies) is proposed to minimise the number of law enforcement checks along prioritised road networks;  
- Given the scarcity of data on road safety and operator compliance, the use of smart technologies (e.g. cell phones with scanning and reading capabilities) by law enforcement officials will allow the electronic capturing of road traffic data. Once data linkages have been established between relevant role-players, the sharing of real-time data between interested parties will become much easier;  
- Given the Agency’s law enforcement function, C-BRTA inspectors should support and participate in joint law enforcement inspections since the centralisation of law enforcement checks will result in time savings for motorists and public transport operators. | Additional law enforcement officers should be deployed along strategic national roads to conduct joint law enforcement inspections with other role-players;  
- Law enforcement officers should be exposed to training programmes to guide joint law enforcement inspections and to familiarise themselves with the use of smart technologies; and  
- Steps should be set in motion to move towards setting up data linkages between key public sector role-players to enable the sharing of real-time data. | C-BRTA to engage the following stakeholders:  
- Law enforcement agencies;  
- Other prioritised government departments (e.g. SARS); and  
- Private sector. | On-going. |
4.2 Role of the C-BRTA in Enabling the Implementation of Report Recommendations and Action Plans

The C-BRTA is one of many players operating within the cross border road transport environment. Ultimate success in improving road safety in South Africa, as well as the operational performance of border posts depends on all stakeholders acknowledging the gaps which exist and working in concert towards solving them.

4.2.1 Border Posts

The C-BRTA supports the regional OSBP drive, since it is envisaged that the transformation of prioritised commercial border posts into OSBP’s will address a number of hard and soft infrastructure inefficiencies currently experienced at inland borders.

Since border post projects display a regional character, which involves more than one member state, ultimate success depends on the commitment from all governments in whose jurisdiction projects are located to execute projects within predetermined timeframes. The C-BRTA can render its support towards the execution of OSBP projects in the following way(s):

- Support the implementation of regionally prioritised OSBP projects by engaging with relevant stakeholders in South Africa with a view to seek support from local parties into the implementation of OSBP projects;

- Participate in national task team discussions to path the way for the establishment of a national implementation institution that will assist the public sector in delivering infrastructure projects within budget and according to pre-set time frames;

- Extend the stakeholder consultation drive to regional structures (e.g. SADC Secretariat) and member states once support into the execution of OSBP projects have been obtained from national stakeholders. The establishment of an OSBP requires solid support and commitment at the highest level of government in the member states involved. For this reason regular contact should be established between governments as the various OSBP projects unfold;

- Accelerate the development and implementation of current C-BRTA initiatives, notably the establishment of a cross-border information database that will enable the Agency to capture, process and disseminate real-time information (e.g. movement of cross border vehicles through border posts, origin and destination of cross border vehicles) to national and regional role-players. The successful delivery of internal (C-BRTA) initiatives depends on the ability of the C-BRTA to secure sufficient funds to enable execution;
Through participation in BMA task team discussions, the C-BRTA can voice its support towards the establishment of a single integrated authority (BMA) in 2017. The Agency believes that the harmonisation and integration of border management functions, processes and resources into a single lead department will go a long way towards improving the efficiency and operational performance of border posts.

4.2.2 Road Safety and Operator Compliance

The purpose of the RTI Division is to ensure that cross-border road transport operators comply with national and regional legal guidelines. This division exercises its function(s) through conducting roadside inspections within the boundaries of South Africa.

Through the law enforcement function, the Agency play contributes towards road safety. Although there are plans to migrate law enforcement to the RTMC, in the interim the following actions are proposed:

- Additional C-BRTA inspectors should be deployed along prioritised national and regional roads to conduct joint law enforcement inspections with other law enforcement officials. The deployment of additional RTI resources however, depends on the financial position of the C-BRTA;

- Hefty penalties should be imposed upon cross border road transport operators for serious offences. This includes impounding cross-border vehicles and terminating the operator’s (companies) cross border road transport permit;

- C-BRTA inspectors should use handheld scanning mobile devices that interact with the main central data processor of the Agency. Once data linkages have been established between key public sector role-players, the sharing of real-time information will become common practice. Reliable data on road crashes and fatalities, number of roadside inspections, prosecution and rate of operator compliance is needed to assess the scope of road traffic injuries / operator compliance, to target responses to it, and to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of intervention measures;

- The Agency supports self-regulation. In this regard the Agency should promote self-regulation in the cross-border road transport industry. However, regulatory authorities will need to have oversight of self-regulation systems implemented;

- The implementation of the Operator Compliance Accreditation Scheme (OCAS) should be prioritised as the Scheme will enhance pro-active compliance by cross-border road transport thereby increasing the probability of improving road safety;

- Lastly, greater publicity should be given to the Cross-Alive campaign to ensure that a greater target market is reached. The majority of road accidents in South Africa are caused by human behaviour. Through emphasising the main causes of
road accidents and proposing road safety measures, road safety awareness programmes / initiatives can result in changed driver attitudes and behaviours in the long run.
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